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Abstract
Design and Simulation of Advanced Fault Tolerant Flight Control Schemes
Srikanth Gururajan
This research effort describes the design and simulation of a distributed Neural
Network (NN) based fault tolerant flight control scheme and the interface of the scheme
within a simulation/visualization environment. The goal of the fault tolerant flight control
scheme is to recover an aircraft from failures to its sensors or actuators. A commercially
available simulation package, Aviator Visual Design Simulator (AVDS), was used for the
purpose of simulation and visualization of the aircraft dynamics and the performance of
the control schemes.
For the purpose of the sensor failure detection, identification and accommodation
(SFDIA) task, it is assumed that the pitch, roll and yaw rate gyros onboard are without
physical redundancy. The task is accomplished through the use of a Main Neural
Network (MNN) and a set of three De-Centralized Neural Networks (DNNs), providing
analytical redundancy for the pitch, roll and yaw gyros. The purpose of the MNN is to
detect a sensor failure while the purpose of the DNNs is to identify the failed sensor and
then to provide failure accommodation. The actuator failure detection, identification and
accommodation (AFDIA) scheme also features the MNN, for detection of actuator
failures, along with three Neural Network Controllers (NNCs) for providing the
compensating control surface deflections to neutralize the failure induced pitching,
rolling and yawing moments. All NNs continue to train on-line, in addition to an offline
trained baseline network structure, using the Extended Back-Propagation Algorithm
(EBPA), with the flight data provided by the AVDS simulation package.
The above mentioned adaptive flight control schemes have been traditionally
implemented sequentially on a single computer. This research addresses the
implementation of these fault tolerant flight control schemes on parallel and distributed
computer architectures, using Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) sockets and
Message Passing Interface (MPI) for inter-process communication.
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a
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b
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c

Acceleration, ft/sec2
Node in input layer
Node in hidden layer
Wing span, ft
Node in hidden layer
Node in output layer

_

Greek
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d
e
g
J
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L
m
M
N
p
q
r
R
S
t
T
u
U
v
V
w
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y

Mean aerodynamic chord, ft
Node in output layer
Target Neural Network output
Neural Network training error
Acceleration due to gravity, ft/sec2
Error cost function
Moment of inertia, slug-ft2
Discrete time index
Pattern for the neural network input data
Rolling moment
Lower bound of modified sigmoid activation function
Aircraft mass, slugs
Pitching moment
Yawing moment
Aircraft angular velocity, x body axis (roll rate), rad/sec
Aircraft angular velocity, y body axis (pitch rate), rad/sec
Aircraft angular velocity, z body axis (yaw rate), rad/sec
Auto or cross correlation function
Wing plan form area, ft2
Time, sec
Slope of modified sigmoid activation function
Velocity along body fixed x-axis, ft/sec
Upper bound of modified sigmoid activation function
Velocity along body fixed y-axis, ft/sec
Interconnection weight vector between input and hidden layer nodes
Velocity along body fixed z-axis, ft/sec
Interconnection weight vector between hidden and output layer nodes
Neural Network output

α
α
β
δ
δ
∆
η

Angle of attack, rad or deg
Neural Network momentum rate
Angle of sideslip, rad or deg
Control surface deflection, rad or deg
Neural Network output and hidden layer error term
Error update term
Neural Network learning rate
v

θ
Θ

ρ
ρ

Γ
φ
ψ
Subscripts
A
A
E
h
i
m
n
p
L
R
R
T
x
y
z
Vectors

Pitch Euler angle, rad or deg
Neural Network hidden layer neuron threshold
Density of aircraft
Magnitude of sensor failure
Neural Network output layer neuron threshold
Roll Euler angle, rad or deg
Yaw Euler angle, rad or deg
Aileron
Aerodynamic
Elevator
Index of nodes in input layer
Index of nodes in hidden layer
number of nodes in hidden layer
number of nodes in input layer
number of nodes in output layer
Left side
Right side
Rudder
Thrust
Along the x-direction
Along the y-direction
Along the z-direction

O
Neural network output
Y
Parameters to be estimated
Acronyms
AFA
Actuator Failure Accommodation
AFDI
Actuator Failure Detection and Identification
AFDIA
Actuator Failure Detection, Identification, and Accommodation
AVDS
Aviator Visual Design Simulator
BPA
Back Propagation Algorithm
BSD
Berkeley Software Distribution
COTS
Commodity Off The Shelf
DAEE
Decentralized Neural Network Error Estimation Mean
DVEE
Decentralized Neural Network Error Estimation Variance
DNN
De-Centralized Neural Network
DQEE
De-Centralized Quadratic Estimation Error
EBPA
Extended Back Propagation Algorithm
FCS
Flight Control System
FDI
Failure Detection and Identification
GR
Generalized Likelihood Ratio
GUI
Graphical User Interface
MIMD
Multiple Instruction/Multiple Data
MIMD
Multiple Instruction/Single Data
vi

MLP
MMKF
MNN
MPI
MQEE
NN
NNC
OQEE
PVM
ROC
SFA
SFDI
SFDIA
SISD
SIMD
UDSCB

Multi Layer Perceptron
Multiple Model Kalman Filter
Main Neural Network
Message Passing Interface
Main Quadratic Estimation Error
Neural Network
Neural Network Controller
Output (of NN) Quadratic Estimation Error
Parallel Virtual Machine
Receiver Operating Characteristic
Sensor Failure Accommodation
Sensor Failure Detection and Identification
Sensor Failure Detection, Identification, and Accommodation
Single Instruction/Single Data
Single Instruction/Multiple Data
User Defined Simulation Code Block
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
Operational safety is of paramount importance for both commercial and military aircraft
and more recently for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Over the last decade a significant research
effort has been directed towards increasing operational safety by developing fault tolerant flight
control schemes that would assist the pilot in recovering the aircraft from failures to sensor
systems and more importantly, structural damage to the onboard actuator systems.
The idea of Sensor Failure Detection, Identification and Accommodation (SFDIA) is an
important concept in the implementation of fault tolerant flight control algorithms, especially if
measurements from the onboard sensors are used in the feedback loop of flight control laws. In
fact, if failures in the sensors used in feedback loops are left undetected and unaccounted for,
they may lead to closed loop instabilities and even catastrophic flight conditions. To avoid this
problem, most modern commercial and military aircraft feature triple physical redundancies on
their sensors and use polling schemes to obtain correct sensor values. Analytical redundancy of
sensor systems on-board such aircraft could lead to a reduction in the extra weight attributed to
the physical redundancy on sensors, effectively increasing the payload capacity of the aircraft.
Aircraft actuator systems on board typically include drive servos for the control surfaces,
landing gear, hydraulic subsystems and throttle. Actuator Failure Detection Identification and
Accommodation (AFDIA), refers to failures on the on-board actuator systems. Failures on
actuator systems for elevators, ailerons or rudder, could involve the surfaces being stuck at some
angular deflections. Actuator failures also include the scenarios wherein there is a physical loss
of either a part of or the entire control surfaces, resulting in a loss of efficiency of the failed
control surface and/or a combination of the two.
Typically, actuator failures result in changes in the aircraft trim conditions leading to
dynamic coupling between lateral and longitudinal modes, and could potentially lead to
unrecoverable flight conditions. Although, some aircraft might be equipped with redundant
actuator systems that could handle failures on drive servos, typically, aircraft do not have
physically redundant control surfaces, unlike redundant sensor systems. Therefore, the need for
analytical methods to compensate for failures on any of the control surfaces is much more
critical.

The fundamental task of a fault tolerant flight control system is the detection,
identification, and accommodation of the previously mentioned sensor and actuator failures. The
task of dealing with sensor failure is delegated to the SFDIA scheme, which can be split into two
distinct parts as Sensor Failure Detection and Identification (SFDI), designed to monitor the
sensor systems without physical redundancy for signs of failure and the corresponding
identification and isolation of such failures. Typical failures on sensor subsystems include the
introduction of a sudden bias in the sensor outputs, flat line sensor outputs at magnitude, or slow
moving drift in the sensor outputs. The Sensor Failure Accommodation (SFA) phase of the task
would be responsible for taking over the function of the failed sensor, providing analytical
redundancy and alternate inputs to the flight control system to accommodate for the failed
sensor.
Similarly, the task of dealing with actuator failures is split into two distinct sections as
Actuator Failure Detection and Identification (AFDI), which detects and identifies any failure on
the actuators and the Actuator Failure Accommodation (AFA) phase, which would determine the
control actions needed to compensate for the identified actuator failure and restore the aircraft
back to a stable flight condition with acceptable handling characteristics. In this research effort,
actuator failures refer to physical failures on the control surfaces on an aircraft with or without a
loss of control surface. The issues of failure detection, identification, and accommodation on the
electrical, electro-mechanical or hydraulic subsystems are not addressed. Following control
surface failures and subsequent identification, the accommodation phase is designed to be
achieved by making use of the remainder of the functional and healthy control surfaces.
Failure detection and accommodation schemes based on theoretical schemes such as the
Generalized Likelihood Ratio [18] and Multiple Model Kalman Filtering (MMKF) [18] have
been utilized in the past, but have a significant drawback in that the applicability of such
schemes are limited to linear time invariant systems, with the system model identical to the
Kalman filter or the observer model.
An aircraft can be considered as a time varying, non-linear system with system and
measurement noise. Based on this characteristic, different approaches have to be taken in
designing the failure detection and accommodation scheme. One of the approaches is the use of
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), which are capable candidates for the task, mainly due to their
inherent non-linear nature and learning and adaptation capabilities. The selection of ANN as the
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basis of the adaptive scheme comes with its own advantages and limitations in that the networks
can be trained either off-line, with pre-recorded flight data, or on-line with currently available
flight data. With off-line learning and no subsequent updating of the network architecture with
current data, a network would have a frozen architecture once training cycles are completed,
thereby losing the advantage of learning from the newer on-line information. If such a network is
implemented in the adaptive scheme, it might not be able to detect, identify or accommodate for
a failure situation it had not been trained for, making the entire approach inadequate. This tilts
the balance in favor of training a network on-line; however in this situation, care needs to be
taken when implementing such a scheme as on-line learning has its own set of advantages and
disadvantages. The obvious advantage of on-line learning is that the network can adapt itself to
the real-time data from the aircraft, giving it a better knowledge of current conditions. On the
other hand, the issues of concern are the amount of training that would be necessary for a
network to reach acceptable levels of learning, the time required to do so and the complexity of
network structure. There is also an increased potential for on-line learning to drive the neural
network unstable, leading to catastrophic conditions. Therefore, on-line training of NN for use in
an adaptive scheme for fault tolerance in flight control systems should at the least be a
compromise between learning accuracy and the total time taken for achieving the required level
of accuracy.
In recent years, there has been an increase in the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAV) in both civilian as well as military sectors for a wide range of applications including
aerial reconnaissance of military targets, monitoring traffic, geological mapping, search and
rescue among others. Typically with the use of UAVs, there is a premium on total weight and
cost, in order to maximize their payload potential and as a consequence, the use of redundant
sensors is uncommon.
With the added interest in UAVs, significant amount of research effort has been directed
towards practical implementations of experimental fault tolerant flight control schemes.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Micro Aerial Vehicles have been the more popular platforms of
choice for such experimental research programs. UAV/MAVs provide flexibility and a distinct
advantage as compared to manned aircraft in terms of cost, weight and time and human factors.
They are not expensive, do not take much time to build, and are easier to rebuild, easier to
transport and require minimal to no certification from the Federal Aviation Administration.
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Typically, these aerial platforms feature Commodity, Off The Shelf (COTS) computational
platforms as well as sensor and actuator systems. Due primarily to the strict limitations on the
power available for such onboard systems, the computational power of the on-board processors
are much less than the traditional power available on desktop computational platforms. As a
result, the extent of the complexity of NN based fault tolerant flight control schemes is severely
limited. A workaround for this computational bottleneck is to take the “divide and conquer”
approach. By making use of a computational cluster, made of COTS components, with lower
individual computational capacity and a smaller appetite for power consumption, more complex
fault tolerant flight control schemes can be implemented. This research effort addresses this issue
by decomposing a fairly complex sequential implementation of a NN based fault tolerant flight
control scheme onto a cluster of interconnected computers and executing it in parallel.

1.1

Research Objectives
The objectives of this research effort are to design and simulate Neural Network based

Sensor Failure Detection Identification and Accommodation (SFDIA) and Actuator Failure
Detection Identification and Accommodation (AFDIA) schemes, within an aircraft simulation
and visualization environment. Furthermore, the NN based fault tolerant flight control schemes
are implemented on a distributed computation platform, based on a Beowulf cluster of individual
commodity computers.
The SFDIA scheme focuses on providing analytical redundancy to three important
sensors onboard an aircraft, namely the pitch, roll and yaw rate gyros. It is assumed that these
rate gyros onboard the aircraft are without physical redundancy and the NNs are designed to
provide the requisite analytical redundancy. It is also assumed that all the other sensor systems
on board are reliable and perform without failures of any kind, for the purposes of this research,
although this concept of analytical redundancy can be extended to any number of sensor systems
without any loss of generality.
The AFDIA scheme will focus on providing fault tolerance following failures on two sets
of primary control surfaces, namely the elevators, and the ailerons. For the purpose of this
research, it is assumed that the airplane does not have any unconventional control surfaces such
as differential or symmetric canards, thrust vectoring, differential stabilators, etc.
This research effort is broken into different phases as described below:
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1. Initial development of the neural network based adaptive control schemes;
2. Design and development of an interface within the Matlab environment to provide
flexibility in the creation of the NN structures for the fault tolerant flight control
schemes;
3. Design and implementation of a communication and data transfer scheme between
the Matlab interface, the graphics visualization package, which allows the user to fly
an aircraft model interactively, and the distributed implementation of the fault tolerant
flight control scheme;
4. Implementation of the fault tolerant flight control schemes on the Beowulf cluster
based parallel computational platform;
A more detailed description of the different phases of this research is provided below.
Phase #1:
This phase deals with the initial development of the NN based adaptive flight control
algorithms for the purposes of SFDIA and AFDIA. This included the selection of the aircraft
model, the learning algorithm for the NN, the number of individual networks to train for each
sensor without physical redundancy (pitch, roll, yaw rate), the selection of inputs to each of the
network structures, the failure detection and identification scheme, and finally the failure
accommodation scheme.
Within this phase, the overall structure of the SFDIA scheme was designed to have a
Main Neural Network (MNN) and a set of three Decentralized Neural Networks, DNNs, for each
of the three rate gyros, roll, pitch and yaw rate gyros, assumed to be without physical
redundancy, and named as the P-DNN, Q-DNN and the R-DNN respectively. The individual
DNNs are designed to produce estimates of the respective rate gyros only, while the MNN
produces the estimates of all the three rate gyros. The errors between the estimates from the
DNN and the MNN are continuously monitored and provide a means for detecting and
identifying failures on the sensors as well as accommodating for such failures.
The structure of the AFDIA scheme was built similar to the SFDIA scheme, with the
MNN designed to produce the estimates of the roll, pitch and yaw rate gyros. Three
decentralized neural networks, named as the roll-controller, pitch-controller and the yawcontroller produce estimates of the ailerons, elevators and rudder deflections. When a failure is
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injected on either the elevator or the aileron, it produces a measurable change in the auto and
cross- correlation terms, which are then used to detect and identify the failures. Upon detection
and identification of an actuator failure, these NNCs provide the compensating deflections to the
remainder of the “healthy” control surfaces, to accommodate for the failure.
Phase #2:
Within this phase, a Graphical User Interface (GUI) was designed in Matlab, to provide
the user with an interactive tool to choose the parameters that define the structure of the NNs,
and set the various parameters associated with the SFDIA, AFDIA and the SFDIA+AFDIA
schemes. This GUI tool gives the grater flexibility to choose the input variables to the NNs,
change the time history window of the inputs, the learning and momentum rates for each network
and the number of hidden layer neurons. These parameters are typically hard coded into any
implementation of MLP based NN based schemes, with flexibility limited to selecting the
learning and momentum rates and the number of neurons in the hidden layers.
Phase #3:
Phase 3 of the research study involved the design and implementation of a data
communication and exchange structure to facilitate the flow of information between the Matlab
GUI, the graphical simulation/visualization environment and the Beowulf cluster based
implementation of the fault tolerant flight control schemes. A commercially available
simulation/visualization package, Aviator Visual Display Simulator (AVDS) is chosen for this
purpose. The choice of AVDS over others such as X-Plane, Microsoft Flight Simulator was
influenced primarily by the vast experience in using this package among various members of our
research group. This phase also involved the design and implementation of a Berkeley Software
Distribution (BSD) socket based communication channel and data exchange scheme, between
the NNs and the AVDS environment to facilitate two way data transfer between the nodes
executing the network learning and the node executing the simulation/visualization. The
interface between the Beowulf cluster and the AVDS environment was designed to make use of
TCP/IP sockets. AVDS package runs on a Microsoft Windows 2000 based computer, designated
as “node8” with a private IP address of 192.168.1.8/255.255.255.0. The primary node in the
cluster named as “node1” is designated as the master node and has an IP address of
192.168.1.1/255.255.255.0 with the other nodes having IP addresses in the order
6

192.168.1.2/255.255.255.0 – 192.168.1.6/255.255.255.0 and named as “node2”, “node3”,
“node4”, “node5”, “node6” and “node7”. Message Passing Interface is used to facilitate
communication and synchronization between the nodes on the cluster. Chapter 5 discusses the
setup of the cluster and the communication schemes in detail.
Phase #4:
In Phase 4, a sequential execution mode was built and tested for training the NNs with
the on-line data from AVDS environment. This served as a testbed for validating the
communication schemes between the Matlab interactive GUI, the Beowulf cluster and the AVDS
environment, which was designed and implemented in Phase 3. This process involved the
implementing the NNs in a sequential execution mode, with all the NN modules in the scheme
executing on the same local machine with AVDS running on a dedicated computing node. A
TCP/IP socket based communication channel is used to transfer data from AVDS simulation
environment into the dedicated computing node on which the NNs are implemented. The NNs
that were used for this training purpose were the MNN, P-DNN, Q-DNN and the R-DNN.
Within this structure, the order of execution of the NNs was hard coded with the MNN executing
first, followed by the P-DNN, Q-DNN and the R-DNN, for each frame of data received from
AVDS.
The structure of the sequential execution of the SFDIA/AFDIA algorithm leads to
intuitive decomposition of the tasks for parallel implementation. The next part of phase 4
involved analyzing the sequential SFDIA/AFDIA algorithm and identifying the tasks that could
be parallelized. The algorithm was then broken up into fairly independent and separate tasks that
could be executed in parallel, dealing primarily with the issues of data transfer and
synchronization between the individual tasks.
The initial setup of this parallel implementation is similar to that of the sequential
implementation, with the structure of the NNs set using the Matlab based GUI. This information
about the structures of the NN is then sent to the computer supporting the MNN, the master
node, using TCP/IP sockets. The master node then sends this data to all the other computers on
the cluster, designated as the slave nodes, using MPI directives. The DNNs for both the
SFDIA/AFDIA purposes are then created using the corresponding information. After the
initialization phase, the MNN sends across the parameters of the simulation to AVDS, using a
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separate TCP/IP socket. Thus during each simulation run, there are two TCP/IP sockets open,
one connecting the master node to Matlab and the other connecting the master node to AVDS.
Once the simulation starts, AVDS sends back frames of data at a pre-specified frequency to the
MNN, through socket and MNN consequently distributes this data frame to all the slave nodes in
the cluster, using MPI directives. The MNN as well as the individual nodes then begin executing
the NN code, the outputs of which are communicated back to the MNN using MPI directives.
The MNN then computes the corresponding training error and performs the Failure Detection,
Identification and Accommodation (FDIA) functions. In case of actuator failures, the
compensating control surface deflections, as computed by the AFDIA scheme are then
transmitted back to AVDS simulation using the appropriate socket.
This document is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes approaches/methods adopted
by other researchers to address the issues of fault tolerance in flight control systems, with respect
to failures on both the sensor and actuator systems. Chapter 3 describes the AVDS
simulation/visualization environment; Chapter 4 presents the derivation of the aircraft equations
of motion, Neural Network theory, the Extended Back-Propagation Algorithm and background
information on parallel computing. Chapter 5 describes the design and development of the
structure of the sequential and parallel implementations. Chapter 6 describes the SFDIA and
AFDIA algorithms and the results from the parallel implementations on the Beowulf cluster.
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review
The task of recovering from failures to various sub-systems on-board an aircraft and the
associated issues of detecting, identifying and accommodating them has serious implications on
the performance of airplanes, both manned and unmanned. Considering the avionics, power,
engine, hydraulics and communication sub-systems to be fully functional and free from failure,
the on-board failures can be classified into two broad categories as sensor and actuator failures.
Typical military and commercial aircraft have multiple redundant sensor systems and use
polling methods, among other schemes to get the actual sensor measurements. While this
approach is the traditional safeguard against failed sensor systems, restrictions on the payload
capacity, the power available on board aircraft and the desire to reduce complexity has spurred
researchers towards the development of analytical redundancy wherein computational methods
are used to provide estimates of the outputs of the sensor systems without analytical redundancy.
This approach is attractive especially when applied to low cost UAVs that in recent years have
gained wide acceptance in applications like surveillance and monitoring, search and rescue,
reconnaissance among others.
This section will give a brief overview of techniques developed by other researchers for
sensor failure detection, identification and accommodation. Typically, a sensor failure detection
scheme involves observing the measurements from sensors, which under nominal conditions
follow known and predictable patterns in the presence of system and measurement noise.
Conventional failure detection mechanisms are based on hardware redundancy, using a voting
scheme [16, 17], where the measurements from three identical sensors are compared to each
other. If the measurement metrics from one of the redundant sensors is significantly different
from the other two, it is then classified as failed and thus removed from consideration among the
redundant sensors and a statistical mean of the measurements from the other two sensors is then
used as representing the sensor output in the flight control system. Such a voting scheme is
simple to implement and capable detecting hard failures fast, but has the drawback of increased
hardware complexity, power requirements, and increased weight on board the aircraft. These
disadvantages render this scheme unsuitable in situations such as low cost and low weight
UAVs, where reduced cost, power and weight are critical factors. Analytical redundancy
presents itself as an attractive alternative in such situations. Analytical redundancy refers to the
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use of mathematical models of the sensors to estimate their outputs. The estimates of the actual
signals that are computed by these analytical methods are then compared against the sensor
outputs, generating an error signal, which can then be used to signal a failure.
Analytical approaches to failure detection and accommodation have included the use of
Multiple Model Kalman Filtering (MMKF) [17, 18] with ‘n’ observation models generated
offline and stored in the onboard computer. Of the ‘n’ models, ‘n-1’ represent different types of
sensor failures and one represents the nominal condition. Monitoring the Bayesian probability
statistics of the outputs from all the models and checking which of the models matches with the
actual output, provides failure detection and identification of the failure mode. The drawback of
this method is that its effectiveness depends on a pre-determined set of failure models, making it
less effective in case of failures that are not previously modeled. Furthermore, this is based on
the operation of a Kalman filter and is limited to a linear model of the aircraft, making it
sensitive to modeling errors. NNs are interesting analytical tools as they can be applied to
systems that are either linear or non-linear. Over the last decade, several schemes have been
proposed using NN as a tool for FDI [19-25]. An adaptive NN augmented observer by Sreedhar
[21] uses a sliding mode observer to characterize the un-modeled dynamics to train the neural
network while a new approach for sensor failure detection identification and accommodation
using a neural network by Guo and Nurre [19] is useful when the relationship between the
sensors is too complex to be modeled by a Kalman filter estimator. The use of NN for the system
identification and control of non-linear systems is discussed in Narendra [22,23]. Also,
Polycarpou [24,25] discusses systematic procedures for constructing non-linear estimation
algorithms and stable learning schemes using the Lyapunov synthesis approach. The technical
literature [26-35] discusses the use of neural networks in aircraft flight control.
Previous work at West Virginia University [33-39] has addressed the issue of sensor and
actuator failure detection, identification and accommodation, using various approaches including
Neural Networks, Fuzzy Logic, Kalman predictor and Eigenstructure Assignment. An [1]
addresses the issue of improving the NN based SFDIA schemes for detecting soft failures which
are characterized by accumulation of errors in the sensors over a period of time, and also the
integration of the sensor failure and actuator failure scenarios. This task was divided into two
sub-divisions, namely Sensor Failure Detection and Identification (SFDI), to monitor the extent
of deterioration of the sensor systems and Sensor failure accommodation (SFA), to deal with the
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accommodation of the failed sensor by means of the NN scheme. Similarly, the actuator failure
section is divided into two tasks as Actuator Failure Detection and Identification (AFDI),
monitoring the extent of the cross coupling of the longitudinal and lateral direction dynamics, a
situation that indicates a loss of symmetry corresponding to an actuator failure and Actuator
Failure Accommodation (AFA) task, which deals with the controller actions to recover from
failure. The SFDIA scheme is important particularly when the inputs from the sensors are used in
feedback loops of the flight control systems. If left undetected and uncompensated, such
inaccuracies would eventually build up in the system, resulting in closed loop instability and
potentially unrecoverable flight conditions. Current solutions to overcome this problem have
been to have multiple physical redundancies, typically triple physical redundancy, but this has its
own drawbacks in terms of the weight of the redundant sensors, the power required to maintain
them and increased hardware complexity.
Although accommodating for sensor failures is an important issue, the task of identifying
and accommodating for failures to the actuator systems, particularly the control surfaces on
aircraft take a higher precedence. Actuator failures during flight more often than not lead to
catastrophic and unrecoverable flight conditions. Since there are limitations on the forms of
physical redundancy that can be incorporated into an aircraft to compensate for actuator failures,
software based approaches that attempt to compensate for the failures using the remainder of the
healthy control surfaces have been extensively studied in recent years. Aircraft dynamics are
non-linear in nature, especially after failures on the actuator systems. Solutions to the control of
such non-linear systems has been to decompose the non-linear system into a number of linear
systems, around various operating points, allowing for control schemes using gain scheduling.
On-line parameter estimation based gain scheduling approaches [51] have been used for
implementing fault tolerant flight control systems.
Gain scheduling approach to fault tolerance relies on the reconfiguration and recomputation of controller gains for the predetermined set of linear models. The dependence on a
set of predefined models and the extensive computational burden in the redesign of the controller
gains is a drawback for this method.
In recent years, several experimental programs have addressed the issue of fault tolerance
through flight testing. The Reconfigurable Control for Tailless Fighter Aircraft (RESTORE) [5254] program and the Intelligent Flight Control System (IFCS) [55-65] are two examples of many
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such experimental programs. The purpose of the RESTORE program was the development and
evaluation of reconfigurable flight control algorithms. Unlike traditional control systems, the
control laws within the RESTORE project were designed to compensate for unknown failures on
aircraft control surfaces by adapting themselves to the changing aircraft dynamics. The controller
designed by the Boeing team, within the RESTORE project is designed to be modular and is
based on dynamic inversion and the neural network designed to regulate the inversion errors
between the pre-determined aircraft model and the true aircraft dynamics. This error in inversion
could be caused by an actuator failure or damage to the aircraft structure. The response from the
control algorithms to compensate for the failures onboard the aircraft was distributed to the
remainder of the functional surfaces by means of a control allocation module. Two flights were
flown in December 1998 proving the feasibility of the adaptive control approach. The Tailless
Fighter Aircraft X-36 is shown below in Figure 2-1.

Figure 2-1 : Tailless Fighter Aircraft X-36

The modular control architecture of the RESTORE project is as shown in the following
figure.
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Figure 2-2 : Boeing RESTORE Controller

The Intelligent Flight Control System was established at NASA Dryden Flight Research
Center to design aircraft flight controls that can optimize aircraft flight performance
characteristics under both nominal and failure modes. The IFCS is designed to use the self
learning concepts of NNs into flight control software to enable the pilot to maintain control of
aircraft with major systems failure or combat damage. The first generation of the IFCS, referred
to as the GEN-1 approach is based on a direct adaptive neural network based flight control
system. The Gen-1 controller was designed to estimate the changes in the aircraft aerodynamics
as a result of failure modes. This information is provided to the flight control scheme which then
identifies the stability and control derivatives of the aircraft, as an indicator of the aircraft
dynamic characteristics and is then used to stabilize the aircraft. Flight tests of the Gen-1
controller were flown onboard a test-bed aircraft, the NASA NF-15B (NASA 837) shown below
in Figure 2-3.
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Figure 2-3 : IFCS Gen-1 Test bed Aircraft (NASA 837)

The general block diagram of the IFCS Gen-1 controller is shown below in Figure 2-4.
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Figure 2-4 : Architecture of IFCS Gen-1 Controller

The IFCS Gen-2 controller concept is based on a dynamic inversion controller with a
model following command path. The general block diagram of the Gen-2 IFCS flight controller
is shown in Figure 2-5.
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Figure 2-5 : Architecture of IFCS Gen-2 Controller

The feedback errors that are generated are controlled with a Proportional + Integral (PI)
controller and this basic system is augmented with an adaptive NN that operates directly on
feedback errors. The NN then adjusts the system for the erroneous behavior or changes in the
aircraft characteristics after failure. The dynamic inversion part of the control system produces
acceleration commands that are translated into control surface deflections by a control allocation
scheme. Initial PID test flights with IFCS NNs pre-trained to the F-15’s aerodynamic database
was test flown in the spring of 1999. It must be noted that a portion of the current flight testing
activities at West Virginia University is directed towards the implementation of the Gen-2
controller scheme on the WVU YF-22 UAV research platform.
Flight controls research at West Virginia University has addressed the issues of flight
testing fault tolerant flight control laws [50]. Gu describes the “design development and flight
testing of a Neural Network based Fault Tolerant flight Control System to accommodate for
actuator failures”. Within the research effort, the author demonstrates the ability of a set of flight
control systems to maintain aircraft handling qualities in the presence of failures on actuators.
The author describes actuator failures on the Ailerons as the Right Aileron locked at Trim
position and the failures on the Elevator as the Right Elevator locked at Trim position. The test
bed aircraft used in that research effort is shown in Figure 2-6.
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Figure 2-6 : WVU YF-22

Conventionally, NN based fault tolerant flight control schemes are implemented on a
standalone computational platform, although the inherent structure of the NN makes it a prime
candidate for implementation on parallel computer architectures. Implementing the neural
networks in parallel is effective in reducing the training time and also paves the way for
incorporating more complex training algorithms. Recent work [40,41], among many others, has
addressed the topic of implementation of NN on parallel computers by splitting the network
structure into component modules and executing them concurrently. This research effort attempts
to decompose a sequential implementation of a NN based fault tolerant flight control scheme into
a set of high level modules, with each module executing an independent task. This differs from
the network level decomposition approach of other researchers [40,41].
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Chapter 3 - Visualization Environment
3.1

Aviator Visual Design Simulator (AVDS)
An important segment of this research is the use visualization environment to graphically

display the results of the simulation. The demands on the visualization environment are that it
should be able to render three-dimensional images of the aircraft and at the same time be capable
of supporting an interactive simulation, accepting user-generated inputs via a joystick. The
Aviator Visual Design Simulator (AVDS) is a commercially available flight simulation package
[6] that satisfies the above requirements and provides desirable configuration options such as
user definable aircraft models and dynamics. The AVDS software package is a product of a joint
research effort between Artificial Horizons Inc. and the United States Air Force and is a set of
PC based simulation and visualization tools, designed for use by students, teachers, engineers
and designers for aircraft research and development purposes. A typical AVDS
simulation/visualization screen is shown in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3-1 : AVDS Simulation/Visualization Environment

Some of the appealing features of the AVDS simulation package are:
•

AVDS can be used interactively to simulate aircraft design and provide animated
results of batch simulations;
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•

AVDS can be used for testing flight control systems design with the userdefinable interactive simulation model;

•

AVDS contains user definable aircraft images including articulated control
surfaces;

•

AVDS is designed to accept user defined aircraft models, by means of

three-

dimensional lookup tables;
•

AVDS is capable of interactive simulation with external hardware inputs and
hardware-in-the-loop simulations;

•

AVDS is capable of distributing simulation and visualization tools over a network
of computers, forming a rudimentary distributed computing and simulation
network.

The recommended system configuration for supporting the AVDS simulation package are
listed below:

3.2

•

PentiumR processor based personal computer;

•

MicrosoftR Windows 95/98, WinNTR or later operating system;

•

A graphics accelerator;

•

At least 32 MB RAM;

•

At least 110 MB of disk space.

Architecture of AVDS
This section describes the architecture of the AVDS simulation environment as installed

on a Microsoft Windows based personal computer. When AVDS is installed, it creates seven sub
directories under the installation directory. The following section describes each of the seven
directories and its file contents.
•

“bin” directory
The “bin” directory contains three files, namely, “avds.exe”, “avds.std.ini” and
“avds.ini”. The avds.std.ini is a text file written in the standard windows “ini” format,
and is used to store the multicast addresses, while the avds.ini file contains the file and
path names for the AVDS setup files.

•

“craft” directory
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This directory contains a file named “craftcap”, that is used to identify the
aircraft image definition files and sample aircraft image definition files. This enables the
user to change the appearance of existing aircraft images and add new aircraft image
files.
•

“model” directory
This directory contains a file “modelcap” that is used to identify user-defined
models, a “makefile” used to compile user-defined code into a dynamic linked library, a
sample flight control system file and a file with the aircraft model source code. The
sample source code enables the user to modify the structure of the existing aircraft
models or add new flight control system or aircraft files. This modified source code is
then compiled into a “dll” using the “makefile” and added to the simulation using the
“modelcap” file.

•

“ports” directory
Similar to the craft and model directories, the ports directory contains files that
define the airport and other structural images used in the simulation. In addition, this
directory contains the “portscap” file that is used to identify the airport image definition
files, and the airport image definition files themselves.

•

“terrain” directory
This directory contains data files that AVDS uses in rendering the terrain, with the
latitude and longitude of the terrain blocks derived from the name of the respective files.

•

“userfiles” directory
The “userfiles” directory contains files that can be used to configure the
simulation or playback on the AVDS window. Among other files, this directory contains
the files, “fighter.ply” and “file.ply”, which are sample configuration files used for
aircraft initialization and playback configuration window, “fighter.av”, which is a
parameter lookup table that can be updated between simulation runs. This directory also
contains the “avds.init” file, a global setup file that saves all the default settings for
AVDS.
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•

“utilities” directory
The utilities directory contains files and tools that used to convert AutoCAD files
to AVDS format, for incorporating new aircraft images into AVDS, sample code and
libraries to develop networked AVDS simulations.

3.3

Interactive Simulation
The interactive simulation mode gives the user the tools to simulate the aircraft dynamics

in near real time while representing the vehicle dynamics graphically and interactively passing
commands to the simulation. The interactive simulation model consists of two parts, namely the
model structure and model parameters. The model structure can either be pre-defined or user
defined and is built up with subroutines that define how the model parameters produce the
vehicle dynamics. The model parameters are specified in a parameter file and read into AVDS
when the interactive simulation begins, allowing the user an extra degree of freedom to change
the model parameters at any time between simulations, without the need to recompile the
program. A text file specifies the model parameters in the form of a lookup table and are
scheduled based on the aircraft velocity, in Mach number, but can be based on other parameters
as well. The lookup table can be extended to be multi-dimensional; up to three dimensions, but is
restricted to be one dimensional within this research effort.
The interactive simulation parameters can be set before the start of the simulation, by
using the simulation configuration window, shown in Figure 3.2, from the Configure menu of
AVDS. A representation of the simulation configuration window is shown below.
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Figure 3-2 : Simulation Configuration Window

The simulation configuration window has two smaller windows within it, with the
window on the left indicating the “OUTPUTS” from the simulation environment and the window
on the right representing the “INPUTS” to the simulation environment. On the right hand side,
the ‘Inputs’ window represents the inputs that are fed into the simulation, the FCS, aircraft
model, to a file for recording and the strip charts. These are similar to the parameters in the
“OUTPUTS” window. The FCS and the aircraft drop down menus offer the user a range of
choices in the type of the flight control system to be integrated with the type of aircraft. These
“FCS” and “AIRCRAFT” options can be pre-defined with options that come packaged with
AVDS or be user-defined, according to the systems and approach that the user designs. These
extra options can be incorporated into the AVDS scheme using user defined simulation code
blocks. The following section describes the procedure associated with creating or modifying user
defined simulation code blocks and including them in the AVDS scheme.

3.4

User Defined Simulation Code Blocks
Both the aircraft models and flight control systems can be modified in several ways, first,

by either changing the aircraft parameter values in the lookup tables or second, by re-writing the
simulation code blocks. This section describes in some detail the process of modifying the
simulation code blocks.
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To redefine the structure of the FCS or the aircraft, the user must add new code or modify
the existing User Defined Simulation Code Blocks (UDSCBs), written in C or a language that
can interface with C. Once these files are written, they are compiled into object files and are
loaded dynamically by the AVDS at runtime for use within the interactive simulations. The
AVDS user manual [6] describes the steps for adding a user defined simulation code block as
follows:
1. Construct the source code to reflect the desired behavior of the flight control system or
the aircraft model, remembering to include the header file usr_cblock.h. This header file
contains information about the user defined simulation code block structure.
2. Define and set the number of user defined simulation code blocks in the variable
‘nBlocks’.
3. Define the user defined simulation code blocks.
4. Add the simulation code blocks to the execution list. Thus, the user defined simulation
code block will be reflected as an option to choose from in the simulation configuration
window.
5. Prototype the initialization and the update functions. These functions will be executed
during the initialization of the model and during the run time, respectively.
6. Declare the user defined simulation code blocks.
7. Add the simulation initialization and update functions using the output[], input[] and
param[] arrays for simulation inputs, outputs and lookup parameters respectively.
8. Compile and link user defined simulation code block source code into a dynamic link
library (dll).
9. Add the name of the dll to the modelcap file. AVDS is designed to recognize the dynamic
link library modules from the modelcap file.
10. Configure the interactive simulation from the simulation configuration window.

Appendix A contains detailed descriptions of the three dimensional lookup tables, and the
user defined simulation code block header information. Appendix B shows a sample of the User
Defined Simulation Code Block header information.
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Chapter 4 - Theoretical Framework
4.1

Mathematical Modeling and Aircraft Equations of Motion
Simulation and visualization of aircraft dynamics on personal computers requires that a

set of mathematical equations model the dynamics of the aircraft under review. This section
addresses that issue and derives the equations of motion of a rigid aircraft, within the earth’s
atmosphere. There are a few assumptions that are made during the process of deriving the
equations of motion, and are noted accordingly. The derivations are handled in extensive detail
in texts on aircraft dynamics [2, 3].
The first step towards deriving the rectilinear and rotational equations of motion of an
aircraft is the choice of coordinate systems in which the equations hold true. The first reference
frame, namely the earth fixed system, is assumed to be an inertial reference system, where
Newton’s laws of motion hold true. The assumption is that the earth fixed axis system is an
inertial frame which allows us to neglect of the rotational velocity of the earth, a result that
would be acceptable for even supersonic flight. The earth fixed axis system is oriented in such a
way that the x-axis is directed due north, the y-axis is directed due east and the positive z-axis is
directed into the x-y plane, according to the right hand rule. The next reference frame, referred to
as the aircraft carried vertical axis system, is obtained by translating the origin of the earth fixed
reference frame to coincide with the center of gravity of the aircraft. The positive directions of
each axis in this system are parallel to the directions of the respective axes within the earth fixed
reference frame. The third reference frame, called the body fixed axis, is attached to the airplane
itself, with the origin coinciding with the center of gravity of the airplane. The positive direction
of the body fixed x-axis is then oriented to pass through the nose of the aircraft, the positive yaxis through the right wing of the aircraft and the positive z-axis is directed into the x-y plane,
according to the right hand rule. The fourth reference frame is called the wind reference system
and is used to describe the aircraft’s flight path. The positive x-axis in this reference frame is
oriented in the direction of the total velocity vector of the aircraft, with the angle of attack α, and
the angle of sideslip β, defined by the orientation of this reference frame with respect to the body
fixed axes. Thus, the airplane dynamics can now be described using these reference frames. For
the purpose of this research, the F4 aircraft model is selected, primarily due to the benign nature
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of its dynamics and the fact that the stability and control derivatives that describe the aircraft are
readily available [2]. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show a three view of a F4 aircraft and the relative
orientations of the reference frames.

Figure 4-1 : 3-View Drawing of F4 Aircraft

X 3 and X

X2
X1

Y1

Θ

Y2 and Y3

Ψ
Φ

Ψ

Φ

Θ

Z3

Z 1 and Z 2

Y

Flight Path
Y'

Z
X'

Earth Fixed Axis
Z'

Figure 4-2 : Airplane Orientation with Euler Angles

The equations of motion for an aircraft are developed from the Newton’s second law of
motion, which states that “the time derivatives of linear and angular momentum are equal to
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the externally applied forces and moments respectively [2]”. This results in a vector-integral
equation of motion, given as:
→
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Eq. 4.1

for linear momentum and
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Eq. 4.2

for angular momentum.
The integrals

∫

V

and

∫

S

represent the total volume and surface area of the airplane. The

above equations are for rigid aircrafts whose external geometry is known. Also, the total mass
→

and mass distribution of the airplane are assumed to be constant with time and the forces ρ A g dv
→

and F ds assumed to be the only external forces acting on the airplane.
The vector-integral equations Eq. 4.1 and Eq. 4.2 can be further reduced to the following
form with respect to the earth frame:
→
.

→

→

→

→

→

m(V P + ω × V P ) = m g + FA + FT

Eq. 4.3

 →. → → → → 
→
→


and ∫ r × ω × r + ω ×  ω × r   ρ A dv = M A + M T
V





Eq. 4.4

→

These equations are the vector forms of the aircraft equations of motion with respect to the earth
reference frame. However, this form is not very friendly to express the steady state and time
history response of the system and so, has to be written in the scalar component forms. Thus, the
scalar component representation of the linear and angular momentum equations with respect to a
the body reference frame is given as
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.

m(U − VR + WQ) = mg x + FAx + FTx

Eq. 4.5

.

m(V + UR − WP) = mg y + FAy + FTy

Eq. 4.6

.

m(W − UQ + VP) = mg z + FAz + FTz

Eq. 4.7

and
.

.

I xx P − I xz R − I xz PQ + ( I zz − I yy ) RQ = LA + LT

Eq. 4.8

.

I yy Q + ( I xx − I zz ) PR + I xz ( P 2 − Q 2 ) = M A + M T
.

Eq. 4.9

.

I zz R − I xz P + ( I yy − I xx ) PQ + I xz QR = N A + NT

Eq. 4.10

The above equations are not sufficient to solve for the time histories of motion, primarily
because of the fact that the gravity components of Eq. 4.5, Eq. 4.6 and Eq. 4.7 depend on the
orientation of the airplane with respect to the earth fixed coordinate system.
The flight path of an airplane relative to the earth fixed axis system can be determined
from the knowledge of the velocity components U, V and W in the body fixed axis system and
the Euler angles. Thus, the relationship between the earth fixed axes velocity components and the
body fixed axes velocity components of the airplane is given as:
.
x'
U1    cosψ − sin ψ 0  cos θ 0 sin θ
  . 

1
0
V1  =  y ' = sin ψ cosψ 0  0
  . 
0
1   − sin θ 0 cos θ
W1   z'  0
 

 1
 0

  0

 U 
 

cos φ − sin φ  V 
sin φ cos φ  W 
0

0

Eq. 4.11

The flight path of the airplane in terms of x '(t ) , y '(t ) and z '(t ) is found by integrating
the terms in equation 4.11. The Euler angles in Eq.4.11 are functions of time and are determined
by integrating the following equations:
.

φ = P + Q sin φ tan θ + R cos φ tan θ

Eq. 4.12

.

θ = Q cos φ − R sin φ

Eq. 4.13

.

ψ = (Q sin φ + R cos φ )secθ

Eq. 4.14

Also, the components of the gravitational force are given as:
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g x = − g sin θ

Eq. 4.15

g y = g sin φ cos θ

Eq. 4.16

g z = g cos φ cos θ

Eq. 4.17

Using the set of equations 4.5-4.17, the time history of the aircraft dynamics can be
obtained by numerical integration.
The following section discusses the theoretical basis of Neural Networks and the learning
algorithms used to train the networks.

4.2

Neural Network Theory
A Neural Network can be defined as “A massively parallel distributed processor that has

a natural propensity for storing experimental knowledge and making it available for use” [4,

42]. They are also commonly referred to in literature as neurocomputers, connectionist networks,
parallel-distributed processors etc. Neural Networks derive their flexibility and computing
power through their ability to learn and generalize, producing reasonable outputs for inputs not
encountered during the learning phase, and the presence of a massively parallel, distributed
structure of individual neurons. A schematic representation of the non-linear model of a neuron
is shown below in figure 4.3.
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Figure 4-3 : Non-Linear Model of a Neuron
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The fundamental elements of a neuron include the synapses, the summing junction and
the activation function. The nature and functionalities of each element are described in the
following section:
•

Synapses are the connecting links between two individual neurons i and j in adjacent
layers in the network architecture, and are characterized by an interconnection weight
wij . The input signal at the neuron j is the product of the output of the neuron i and the

interconnection weight wij .
•

The summing junction is essentially a linear combiner, and sums all the input signals to
the neuron, weighted by the respective synaptic weights.

•

The activation function is used to limit the amplitude of the output from the neuron and is
also sometimes referred to as the squashing function. Typically, the activation function
normalizes the output of the neuron to a closed interval [0,1] or sometimes [-1,1].

•

The model of the neuron also includes an externally applied threshold constant, θ k , that
has the effect of lowering the net input of the activation function.

Mathematically, a neuron can be described using the relationship
p

uk = ∑ wkj x j

Eq. 4.18

and yk = ϕ (uk − θ k )

Eq. 4.19

j =1

where x1 , x2 ....x p are the inputs to each neuron in the input layer and wk1 , wk 2 ....w kp are the
synaptic weights associated with each input. The value uk is the output of the linear combiner or
the summer, θ k is the threshold value, ϕ (.) is called the activating function and yk is the final
output of the individual neuron. The activation function defines the output of the neuron and can
be classified into three basic types as Threshold, Piecewise-Linear and Sigmoid functions.
•

A Threshold function is mathematically defined as
1 if v ≥ 0
0 if v ≤ 0

ϕ (v ) = 
•

Eq. 4.20

The mathematical representation of the Piecewise-Linear function is given as
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1

ϕ (v ) =  0
 −1

•

if v > 0
if v = 0
if v < 0

Eq. 4.21

The Sigmoid function is the most common form of activation function used in
neural networks and is defined as a strictly increasing function that is smooth and
asymptotic. Mathematically, a typical sigmoid function can be expressed as

ϕ (v ) =

1
1 + e − av

Eq. 4.22

where the parameter a is called the slope of the sigmoid function. By varying the
slope parameter, we can obtain various sigmoid functions.
The following section discusses some of the more common neural network architectures
and their properties.

4.3

Neural Network Architectures
The architecture of a neural network is the order of the interconnections between the

individual neurons that make up the overall network. In general, there are four different classes
of network architectures, namely Single Layer Feedforward networks, Multilayer Feedforward
networks, Recurrent networks and Lattice Structures.
•

Single Layer Feedforward networks are the simplest form of a layered neural
network, and have their component neurons organized in a single layer. This is
strictly a feedforward network, where the source nodes of the ‘Input’ layer project
onto the nodes in the ‘Output’ layer, but not vice versa. An example of a single
layer feedforward network would be the linear associative memory, in which an
output pattern is associated with an input pattern by adapting the interconnection
weights between the neurons.

•

Multilayer Feedforward network architectures have more than one layer of
interconnected neurons, referred to as the Hidden Layer, between the ‘Input’ layer
and ‘Output’ layer. The computation nodes associated with the ‘Hidden’ layer are
called as hidden neurons or hidden layer neurons and the presence of these
neurons enables a network to extract higher order statistics and approximate nonlinear functions effectively. The inputs to the activation function of each neuron
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in the ‘Hidden’ layer are then the weighted sum of the outputs from the neurons in
the ‘Input’ layer. These inputs are then passed through the activation function
giving the corresponding output at each node in the Hidden layer, which then
serve as inputs to the neurons of the next layer, until the ‘Output’ layer is reached
where the output from each neuron gives the overall response of the network to
the input pattern.
•

Recurrent networks are distinct from a feedforward network in the aspect that
they have at least one feedback loop in the network architecture. In this
architecture, the output of a neuron is fed back as an input to other neurons in the
same layer, resulting in a feedback network. The output of a neuron is fed to itself
and all the other neurons in the same layer, results in a self-feedback network
architecture.

•

A lattice structure network architecture is characterized by the presence of one,
two or ‘N’ higher dimensional array of neurons with a corresponding set of input
layer neurons. The lattice structure can be considered to be a feedforward
network with the neurons in the output layer arranged in rows and columns, where
the dimension of the lattice characterizes the number of dimensions in space in
which the graph lies.

For the purpose of this research, a multilayer feedforward network was with one hidden
layer chosen as the structure of the neural network. The next section discusses the multilayer
feedforward network in more detail, with respect to its architecture and the learning algorithm
used to train the networks.

4.4

Extended Backpropagation Algorithm
The multilayer feedforward network architecture, also referred to as Multilayer

Perceptrons (MLPs), is one of the more important network architectures. Typically it consists of
an input layer of sensory units, one or more hidden layers of computation nodes and one output
layer of computational neurons. A popular approach to training the MLPs in a supervised
manner is the error-backpropagation algorithm, based on the error-correction learning rule. The
purpose of this rule is to minimize a cost function based on the error ek (t ) = d k (t ) − yk (t ) , where
d k (t ) is the desired output from the network and yk (t ) is the actual response of the network, to
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the input presented, such that the actual response of each neuron in the output layer approaches
the target response in some statistical sense. Figure 4.4 shows a schematic representation of a
multilayer feedforward neural network.

.
.
.
Output Layer
Inputs

Input Layer

Hidden Layer

Figure 4-4 : Multilayer Perceptron with One Hidden Layer

The error-backpropagation training process consists of two distinct phases, namely the
forward phase and the backward phase. In the forward phase, an input pattern is applied to the
nodes in the input layer, which then propagates through the each of the hidden layers, till it
reaches the output layer, where the output at the computational nodes is the overall response of
the network to the input pattern that was presented. Once the overall response of the network is
obtained, it is then compared to the target output and the difference between the two produces an
error term. This error is then propagated backwards, leading to the term backpropagation,
through the network structure and the corresponding interconnection weights are adjusted to
make the response of the network move closer to the desired response. A detailed theoretical
explanation of the derivation of the back propagation algorithm is provided in the text “Neural
Networks: A Comprehensive Foundation” [4].
Although the back propagation algorithm is popular for training multilayer perceptrons, it
has a few drawbacks that make the general algorithm unsuited for the current research. This
section describes a few of the drawbacks of the backpropagation algorithm, particularly with
reference to its activation function, the sigmoid function
overcome these drawbacks:
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1
, and also suggests solutions to
− sum
1+ e j

•

The backpropagation algorithm, applied to a multilayer perceptron, is not
guaranteed to converge to the global minimum, even when the learning rate is
properly selected, as the performance index may have many local minima;

•

Although the backpropagation algorithm can approximate any non-linear
function, it requires extensive training, which makes it unsuitable for on-line
applications.

A few approaches, among others, to overcome the above drawbacks of applying the
backpropagation algorithm to train a multilayer perceptron are:
•

Backpropagation algorithm with a momentum term used in updating the
interconnection weights;

•

Backpropagation with a variable learning rate;

•

Backpropagation with batch training, network pruning and complexity penalty.

A different solution, the Extended Back Propagation Algorithm (EBPA), to overcome
these problems was developed at WVU [43], based on a significantly modified sigmoid
activation function

U −L
1+ e

− net
T

+ L . This uses a heterogeneous network, wherein each neuron in the

hidden and the output layer has its own set of free parameters, namely the upper and lower
bounds of the output range, as well as the slope of the sigmoid activation function. With respect
to the multilayer perceptron architecture shown in Figure 4.5, the following derivations for the
training the multilayer perceptron, using the EBPA, hold good. The modified schemes for the
outputs at each neuron in the hidden and the output layers is given as
n

sumi = ∑ AhVhi + Θi

Eq. 4.23

h =1

U i − Li

Bi = f ( sumi ,U i , Li , Ti ) =

1+ e

−

sumi
Ti

+ Li ; i = 1, 2,… m

for the hidden layer neurons, and
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Eq. 4.24

m

sum j = ∑ BW
i ij + Γ j

Eq. 4.25

i =1

U j − Lj

C j = f ( sum j ,U j , L j , T j ) =

1+ e

−

sum j

+ L j ; j = 1, 2,… p

Eq. 4.26

Tj

for the output layer neurons. This would constitute the forward phase of training, where the
overall response of the network is given by C j .
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Figure 4-5 : Feedforward Multilayer Perceptron
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In the backpropagation or the updating phase, the overall outputs of the network are
compared to the target outputs the network is designed to track, and the error
ek (t ) = d k (t ) − yk (t ), ∀k neurons in the output layer is propagated backwards, to update the
values of the interconnecting weights and thresholds at each neuron in both the hidden and
output layers, as a means to minimize the difference between the overall output of the network
and the actual parameter being tracked.
The first step in the back propagation step is to determine the partial derivatives of the
network with respect to each of the parameters in the network. For the output layer, taking the
partial derivatives with respect to the upper bound, lower bound and the gradient results in the
following expressions:
f sum j =
'

fU j =
'

fLj =
'

fT j =
'

∂f ( sum j , U j , L j , T j )
∂sum j

∂f ( sum j ,U j , L j , T j )

∂L j
∂f ( sum j , U j , L j , T j )
∂T j

(C j − U j )(C j − L j )

1+ e

−

Eq. 4.28

sum j
Tj

1

= 1−

1+ e
=

Eq. 4.27

T j (U j − L j )

1

=

∂U j
∂f ( sum j ,U j , L j , T j )

=−

−

sum j

= 1 − fU j

'

Eq. 4.29

Tj

sum j (C j − U j )(C j − L j )
T 2 j (U j − L j )

=−

sum j f sum j
Tj

'

Eq. 4.30

Similarly, at the hidden layer:
f sumi =
'

fU i =
'

f Li =
'

( B − U i )( Bi − Li )
∂f ( sumi , U i , Li , Ti )
=− i
Ti (U i − Li )
∂sumi

∂f ( sumi ,U i , Li , Ti )
=
∂sumi

Eq. 4.31

1
1+ e

∂f ( sumi ,U i , Li , Ti )
= 1−
∂sumi

−

Eq. 4.32

sumi
Ti

1
1+ e

−

sumi
Ti

= 1 − fUi

'

sumi f sumi
∂f ( sumi ,U i , Li , Ti ) sumi ( Bi − U i )( Bi − Li )
fTi =
=
=−
2
T i (U i − Li )
Ti
∂sumi
'
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Eq. 4.33
'

Eq. 4.34

Once the partial derivatives are computed, the next step is the formulation of the error
term to be minimized. At the output layer, the difference between the overall network output and
the target network output constitutes the error term and are given as:
'
δ sum = f sum
(Y j − C j )

Eq. 4.35

δ U = fU' (Y j − C j )

Eq. 4.36

δ L = f L' (Y j − C j )

Eq. 4.37

δ T = f T' (Y j − C j )

Eq. 4.38

j

j

j

j

j

j

j

j

These errors are then propagated back to the neurons in the hidden layer, where the
formulation of the error term at each neuron is not straight forward as they are at the output
layer, as there are no well-defined target values at any neuron. Thus, the error terms at the hidden
layer are computed using the chain rule, by multiplying the delta terms from the output layer
with the interconnecting weights between the neurons in the hidden and the output layers:
o

'
δ sum = f sum
∑δ sum wij
i

i

δ U = fU'

Eq. 4.39

j

j =1

o

∑δ

wij

Eq. 4.40

δ L = f L' ∑ δ L wij

Eq. 4.41

i

i

j =1

Uj

o

i

i

j =1

j

o

δ T = fT' ∑ δ T wij
i

i

j =1

Eq. 4.42

j

Once the errors and delta terms are determined at both the hidden and the output layers,
the bias terms and interconnecting weights are then updated using the following relationships:

∆Γ j (k ) = ηsumδ sum j + α sum ∆Γ j (k − 1) ; j = 1, 2,… o

Eq. 4.43

∆Θi (k ) = ηsumδ sumi + α sum ∆Θi (k − 1); i = 1, 2,… m

Eq. 4.44

and the weights are updated as
∆wij ( k ) = ηsumδ sum j Bi + α sum ∆wij (k − 1)

Eq. 4.45

∆vhi ( k ) = ηsumδ sumi Ah + α sum ∆vhi (k − 1)

Eq. 4.46

Now the upper and lower bounds as well as the temperatures on all the neurons in both
the hidden layer and the output layer are updated using:
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∆U j ( k ) = ηuδ U j + α u ∆U j (k − 1)

Eq. 4.47

∆L j (k ) = ηLδ L j + α L ∆L j (k − 1)

Eq. 4.48

∆T j (k ) = ηT δ T j + αT ∆T j (k − 1)

Eq. 4.49

∆U i ( k ) = ηiδ Ui + αU ∆U i ( k − 1)

Eq. 4.50

∆Li (k ) = ηLδ Li + α L ∆Li (k − 1)

Eq. 4.51

∆Ti (k ) = ηT δ Ti + αT ∆Ti (k − 1)

Eq. 4.52

In the above equations, the terms η and α represent the learning rate and the momentum
rates. The learning rate is a factor that determines the amount by which each parameter is
updated at each time step. The momentum term controls the extent of the contribution of the
weights in the previous time step on the current weights. Additional degrees of freedom can be
achieved by having different learning and momentum rates for each of the parameters. This
learning algorithm has a few advantages over the traditional backpropagation algorithm, such as
a more degrees of freedom with regards to learning due to the presence of the parameters U, L,
and T in the activation function. Also, this learning algorithm is more likely to avoid the local
minima problem that is traditionally associated with the backpropagation algorithm and
potentially learn faster and more accurately than the traditional backpropagation algorithm.
There are some downsides to this learning method in that this takes approximately 30%-50%
more computations, due to the presence of the extra degrees of freedom in U, L and T, although
this issue is of concern only when the method is applied to on-line learning.

4.5

Flynn’s Taxonomy and Message Passing Interface
Enough! That is an expression hardly used by researchers in the same sentence as

computational power. Ever since the dawn of the computer era, researchers and scientists have
been clamoring for increased computational capacity, something that has not been satisfied even
with the recent advances in semiconductor technology. Therefore, to meet the requirements for
higher computational power, with the existing microprocessor technology, a new computing
paradigm, parallel computing, was developed, wherein more than one distinct processor would
work together, forming a parallel computer, to solve a given task. The parallel computer
architectures were originally classified according to a popular scheme known as Flynn’s
taxonomy, developed by Flynn in 1966 [44]. This classified the parallel computers into four
36

distinct classes, based on the number of instruction and data streams, as single instruction single
data (SISD), multiple instruction multiple data (MIMD), single instruction multiple data (SIMD)
and multiple instruction single data (MISD) architectures.
The classical von Neumann computer is an example of the SISD architecture and has just
a single instruction stream and a single data stream.

Input

Central Processing Unit

Output

Memory

Figure 4-6 : Classic von Neumann Computer Architecture

The SIMD computer architecture has a single central processing unit exclusively
dedicated to control and a bunch of slave arithmetic and logic units, each with its own memory.
During each instruction cycle, the central processing unit sends an instruction to all the
subordinate processors, which then execute it or remain idle. The general MIMD architecture is
different from the SIMD architecture in the aspect that each processor in a MIMD system is a
fully autonomous central processing unit, with its own control unit as well as arithmetic and
logic unit. Thus, the MIMD systems are asynchronous in nature and are capable of executing its
own set of instructions at its own pace.
The MIMD architecture is further divided into two distinct groups as shared memory and
distributed memory architectures. The shared memory architecture consists of a collection of
distinct processors and distinct memory modules, interconnected by a communication network.
Figure 4.6 shows a schematic representation of generic shared memory architecture.
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Figure 4-7 : Generic Shared Memory Architecture

On the other hand, with distributed memory architecture, each processor has its own
private memory, and is connected to other processors by a common communication network.
Figure 4.7 shows the schematic representation of generic distributed memory architecture.

Figure 4-8 : Generic Distributed Memory Architecture

The more popular methods of programming shared memory systems involves one of the
various forms of message passing, Message Passing Interface or Parallel Virtual Machine,
where the individual processes coordinate their activities by explicitly sending and receiving
messages. The popularity of the message passing paradigm can be attributed to a large extent to
its portability and its ability to run on heterogeneous systems, from distributed memory systems,
shared memory systems, network of workstations, or a combination of the above. The Message
Passing Interface (MPI) is described as “a standardized portable message passing system,
designed by a group of researchers from academia and industry, to function on a wide variety of
parallel computers” [45]. MPI standard provides efficient and reliable communication interface
between processes, avoiding memory-to-memory copying, and facilitates overlap of computation
and communication, with the ability to offload the communication to a secondary processor. The
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Parallel Virtual Machine (PVM) can be described as a software package that allows the user to
create and access a concurrent computing system created from a network of loosely coupled
processing elements including standalone workstations, vector processors or even parallel
supercomputers. The distinguishing factor of PVM is that it makes the heterogeneous collection
of computers appear as a single virtual machine, leading to its name [46].
In recent years, the publication of the OpenMP standard for shared memory parallelism
has provided developers with another portable and scalable API for writing parallel programs.
Salient features of OpenMP are that it is made up of a simple set of directives and can provide
incremental parallelism and does not have to deal with message passing and allows the use of
shared data.
For the purpose of this research, MPI is chosen as the communication paradigm, due
mainly to the ease of programming and the availability of extensive support. MPI is portable and
does not require any special compilers to work. Within this research effort, SIMD architecture is
followed, with source code written as a single chunk of instruction sequence with each node on
the cluster executing a section of the code, based on its rank. The individual processes execute in
its own address space communicate with each other via calls to MPI primitives. This is a
substantial advantage when applied to the adaptive flight control system scheme as different
modules of the scheme can be programmed to attain its own goals and execute on different
computers. Figure 4.8 shows an example of a parallel program written in C using MPI for
communication [47]. In this example, six distinct processes, one of which is designated as the
root process, are spawned on six different machines. The non-root processes send a greeting to
the root, which then displays it as its output. The result of the program is shown in Figure 4.9.
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greetings.c -- greetings program
Send a message from all processes w ith rank != 0 to process 0.
Process 0 prints the messages received.
Input: none.
Output: contents of messages received by process 0.
/
include <stdio.h>
include <string.h>
include "mpi.h"
ain(int argc, char* argv[]) {
int my_rank;
/* rank of process
*/
int p;
/* number of processes */
int source;
/* rank of sender
*/
int dest;
/* rank of receiver
*/
int tag = 0;
/* tag for messages
*/
char message[100];
/* storage f or message
*/
MPI_Status status;
/* return status f or receive */
/* Start up MPI */
MPI_Init(&argc, &argv);
/* Find out process rank */
MPI_Comm_rank(MPI_COMM_WORLD, &my_rank);
/* Find out number of processes */
MPI_Comm_size(MPI_COMM_WORLD, &p);
if (my_rank != 0) {
/* Create message */
sprintf (message, "Greetings f rom process %d!", my_rank);
dest = 0;
MPI_Send(message, strlen(message)+1, MPI_CHAR, dest, tag, MPI_COMM_WORLD);
}
else
{
/* my_rank == 0 */
for (source = 1; source < p; source++) {
MPI_Recv(message, 100, MPI_CHAR, source, tag, MPI_COMM_WORLD, &status);
printf("%s\n", message);
}
}
/* Shut dow n MPI */
MPI_Finalize();

Figure 4-9 : Example of a MPI Based Program
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----PBSPrologueReport---Bef ore running, there are 8 IPC semaphores and IPC shared memory segments on node4
Greetings f rom process 1!
Greetings f rom process 2!
Greetings f rom process 3!
Greetings f rom process 4!
Greetings f rom process 5!
node4
node4
node3
node3
node2
node2
PBSEpilogues Report
PBSJOB(10126.energy ):managedby node4
/usr/spool/PBS/aux/10126.energy

Figure 4-10 : Result of the MPI “greetings” Program
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Chapter 5 - Design of the Experimental Setup
5.1

Matlab GUI
This chapter discusses the experimental setup that was used for the implementation of the

NN based fault tolerant flight control system addressed within this research effort.
The experimental setup covers subtasks includes the design and implementation of a
Matlab based Graphical User Interface (GUI) that allows the user to interactively setup the task
at hand, the setup of the graphical simulation/visualization environment to allow for data
exchange between itself and the flight control schemes, followed by the setup of the Beowulf
cluster based computation platform.
The first sub-task involved the development of the GUI and was developed within the
Matlab 5.3 environment for this research study. The initial GUI screen is shown below.

Figure 5-1 : Main User Interface

On this initial screen, when the “Initialize Parameters” button is clicked, it calls an
initialization script which then initializes the handles for all the graphics objects on this screen,
and sets the default parameters for all the seven NNs, including the MNN, P-DNN, Q-DNN, R-
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DNN, ROLL-NNC, PITCH-NNC and the YAW-NNC. Once the graphics object handles are
initialized, the script then activates the buttons that presents the user an option to select between
pre-trained NNs or un-trained NNs. Once the choice of the networks are made, the script then
activates the graphics objects on the main GUI and displays the current settings of the NN
structures that were chosen. This GUI is setup in such a way that the user can scroll through the
different NN structures using the scroll buttons.
The inner workings of the GUI can be explained with the help of an example. Taking the
MNN as the test case, in order to alter its structure, the user has to scroll forward or backward to
display the current setting of the MNN. Once this is done, clicking on the “Change Parameters”
button will bring up the second layer of the GUI. The second layer of the GUI is shown below.

Figure 5-2 : Change Parameters Window

Within this GUI, when the “Initialize Window” button is clicked, the script determines
which network was selected in the previous screen and then brings up the current setting of the
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network structure and displays the parameters in the appropriate fields. Traditionally, MLP based
neural network structures have been hand coded into the program code. This makes it
cumbersome to alter the structure of the networks if the need arises. This GUI based approach
makes the design of the network structure flexible and the user can choose to vary any of the
parameters that define the network. The first parameter in this window is the number of input
variables that are used to estimate the outputs from the NN. The default setting for the MNN is 8
variables. The other parameters are the number of Hidden layer neurons, the input data pattern,
the learning rate of the network and the momentum rate of the network. The input data patters in
the value that determines the number of time steps back in time that the NN reaches to gather its
input data, to estimate its outputs at the current time step. After changing any of these
parameters, clicking on the “Apply” button sets the appropriate values in memory. The user also
has an option to choose the input variables to the NN. When the “New” button is clicked, a
popup window presents the user with a list of variables that are sent across from the simulation
environment. The user can choose the inputs to the NN from this popup window. The variables
that are chosen from this popup window are identified by their indexes and are stored in an array
in the order that they were chosen. The popup window that allows the user to choose the input
variables is shown below.
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Figure 5-3 : Choose Variables

Once the variables for the NN are chosen and “Apply Settings” button is clicked, the user
is taken back to the main GUI window. On the main GUI, once all the network parameters are
set to the user’s satisfaction, clicking on the “Ok” button would activate the buttons to select the
task to be executed. The tasks that can be selected are “Simulation”, “Train”, “SFDIA”, “AFDIA”
and “SFDIA+AFDIA”. “Simulation” allows the user to run a simulation of the aircraft dynamics
within AVDS with predefined maneuvers that are generated offline. The “Train” option allows
the user to train the networks for the purpose of the SFDIA or the AFDIA tasks. This training
can be done either offline or on-line with data from the AVDS environment. If the “Offline”
training option is chosen, then the user is allowed to “fly” the aircraft within AVDS and the
resulting data is then stored on the computer. This data can then be accessed offline and used to
train the NN. If the “On-line” training option is chosen, the user can “fly” the aircraft within
AVDS and simultaneously train the NN with on-line data. The difference between the scheme
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training the NN offline and the scheme training the NNs on-line are in the way the inter-process
communication schemes are setup. In the case of on-line training, data frames are sent across
from the AVDS environment where the aircraft is flown to the NN structures at a pre defined
frequency of 30 Hz. On the other hand, for training the networks offline, the aircraft is flown and
the data store on the computer. This data is then used independently of AVDS to train the
networks.
The “SFDIA” option brings up another GUI, shown below, wherein the user can set the
parameters for the SFDIA task. This GUI allows the user to select between pre-defined failure
scenarios or custom defined failure scenarios. The parameters of the failure scenarios include the
gyro which is set to fail, the type of failure on the selected gyro and the magnitude of the failure.
The user can then choose the time of injection of the failure on the rate gyros. The types of
failure include step and ramp type failures. This also allows the user to set the thresholds for
failure detection and identification sub-tasks.

Figure 5-4 : SFDIA Task Window
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Clicking on the “Ok” button on this GUI window sets the parameters for the SFDIA task
in memory and returns control to the Main GUI.
Similar to the GUI for the SFDIA task, the “AFDIA” button on the main GUI brings up
another window that allows the user to set the parameters for the AFDIA task. The GUI for this
is shown below. The parameters for the failure scenarios in this case include the control surface
that is set to fail on the aircraft, the magnitude of the failure and the effectiveness of the failed
surface which defines the amount of surface that is assumed to be lost.

Figure 5-5 : AFDIA Task Window

Within the AFDIA task window, the user has a choice to selecting between predefined
failure scenarios or custom defined scenarios. With both options, the user has to set the time of
injection of the failure and the thresholds for the detection and identification of the actuator
failures. Clicking on the “Ok” button sets the parameters for the AFDIA task in memory and
returns control to the main GUI.
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The next task option that is available on the main GUI is the option for “SFDIA+AFDIA”
task. Within this task, both sensor failures and actuator failures are introduced on the aircraft.
The GUI that allows to user to define the parameters of failure injection, detection and
identification for the SFDIA+AFDIA task is shown below. Within this GUI, the user can select
the failure options, thresholds, and the time of failure injection in the same manner as they were
selected for the individual tasks.
Once the parameters that define the specific task chosen are set, the control returns to the
main window, where the total time of simulation can be entered. The user is now ready to run the
simulation for the task at hand.
The data exchange scheme is based on the client-server model, set in such a way that the
Matlab environment under which this GUI runs is running the client side socket, while the
master node on the Beowulf cluster is running the server side socket. The communication
scheme is shown in the Figure 5-7.

Beowulf Cluster
Master Node
node1

MATLAB
Environment

BSD Socket Interface

Server side
sockets

Client side
sockets

Figure 5-6 : Cluster - Matlab Interface

5.2

AVDS Interface
Towards the goal of creating a graphical front end to the adaptive flight control scheme, a

commercially available visualization package, Aviator Visual Design Simulator (AVDS),
designed as a joint project between Artificial Horizons Inc. and the United States Air Force is
chosen. Although other graphics packages are available, such as X-Plane etc, this package was
chosen mainly due to previous experience in using the package, within the research group. This
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AVDS package gives the user the freedom to integrate their own control systems and aircraft
model into the simulation and visualization of aircraft dynamics.
One of the goals of this phase is the creation of a “communication channel” between
AVDS and the adaptive flight control scheme codes to allow a smooth exchange of data. The
communication channel is based on a client-server model and uses BSD sockets for inter-process
communication. The AVDS environment set as the client while the master node in the Beowulf
cluster is set as the master. Figure 5-8 shows a schematic representation of the scheme. Within
the source code that generates the aircraft dynamics and visualization in AVDS, the client side
socket is initialized, during the initialization phase of AVDS. This client side socket then waits
for the server to send the parameters of the simulation that AVDS uses to determine the length of
simulation and the task that the user wants to run. If the task that is to be run is the AFDIA
procedure, then the AVDS client receives the appropriate parameters from the Matlab
environment, via the Beowulf cluster master node.

Beowulf Cluster
Master Node
node1

AVDS
Environment

BSD Socket Interface

Server side
sockets

Client side
sockets

Figure 5-7 : Cluster – AVDS Interface

5.3

Beowulf Cluster Setup
The SFDIA and the AFDIA tasks are designed to be executed on a distributed computing

environment. A Beowulf cluster made up of commodity components is used as the distributed
computing environment within this research effort.
The cluster is made up of seven distinct compute nodes, node1-7and while node8
supports the AVDS simulation/visualization. It must be noted that node8 is not explicitly a part
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of the cluster as it does not communicate directly with the compute nodes on the cluster and
communicates with only the main node by means of sockets. The visualization node could
theoretically exist on an entirely different network, although this would not be advantageous
considering the network traffic and congestion it might encounter. Each of the compute nodes is
a standalone computer, running RedHat 9.0 distribution of the Linux operating system, with
kernel version 2.4.20-8. Table 5-1 lists the specifications of the compute nodes on the cluster. As
mentioned earlier in Chapter 4, the inter-node communication on the cluster is based on the
Message Passing Interface. For this research effort, MPICH 1.2.6 is used. Some of the features of
this version of the portable implementation of the MPI standard include
•

Complete MPI 1.2 standard compliance, including canceling of send

•

Support for MPMD programs and heterogeneous clusters

•

Support for a wide variety of computing environments, including clusters of
Symmetric Multi Processors and massively parallel processors.
Table 5-1 : Specifications of Beowulf Cluster

Node

O.S

CPU

Memory

Task

node1

Linux

500 MHz

128 MB

Master/Compute node

node2

Linux

266 MHz

64 MB

Compute Node

node3

Linux

266 MHz

64 MB

Computer Node

node4

Linux

266 MHz

64 MB

Compute Node

node5

Linux

266 MHz

64 MB

Compute Node

node6

Linux

266 MHz

64 MB

Compute Node

node7

Linux

266 MHz

64 MB

Compute Node

node8

Windows

2000 MHz 1024 MB

AVDS

Each node on the cluster is equipped with a 10/100 Mbps Ethernet card and the nodes
are interconnected via a Cisco Systems, Catalyst 3560G series 48 port switch.
The cluster is setup as a private network with the IP addresses of all the 8 nodes being
192.168.1.1 through 192.168.1.8. The 192.168.1.8 node is the Windows 200 based graphical
interface machine. On the cluster, node1 is set as the master node and is in charge of setting up
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the communication channels between the compute nodes on the cluster and the graphics node on
the Windows machine.
The cluster built for the purpose of implementing the fault tolerant flight control systems
in parallel is shown in the following figure.

Figure 5-8 : Cluster for Parallel Implementation of FDIA

The procedure for setting up a simulation for any of the tasks is as follows. The source
code for the task is first transferred to the master node and then compiled into a binary using the
MPI directive
mpicc –o foo foo.c; rm –f foo.o

The compiled binary is then transferred to all the other compute nodes on the cluster. The
compute nodes, including the master node are setup with a similar directory structure. Before the
binary can be executed on the cluster, the mpd daemons have to be started on all the compute
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nodes. Once the daemons are started, they are connected in a ring, with the last node entering the
ring between the last previously entered node and the first node. On the first node, the mpd
daemons are started by issuing the command
mpd &

and a subsequent call to mpdtrace gives the port number at which the first daemon is
listening. The other nodes connect to this port on the host machine, node1, using the command
mpd –h node1 –p port_number

Once all the compute nodes are in the ring, the binary can be executed on any number of
processes using the command
mpirun –np number_of_processes foo

This command would set the binary running on all the nodes with the code is setup in
such a way to execute a server side socket on the master node. Once the server socket is up and
running on the master node, by clicking on the “Start Data Transfer” button on the main GUI in
Matlab would create a client side socket within Matlab. This client would then connect to the
server side socket on the master node. Once the master node receives the Initialization flag from
the Matlab client, it sends an acknowledgement back to the client and then waits to receive the
simulation parameters. Once the master node receives the simulation parameters, it distributes
the same to all the compute nodes on the cluster using MPI_Send directive. Upon receiving the
simulation parameters, all the compute nodes in the ring, including the master node, then proceed
to initialize their respective NN structures, extracting whatever parameters they need, from the
simulation parameters that was sent across from the Matlab side.
The master node is now ready to receive the initialization flag from AVDS. Once the flag
is received from AVDS, the master node sends appropriate simulation parameters to the AVDS
environment, including the task identification number and the total time of simulation. If the task
on hand is the AFDIA task, then the master node also sends the parameters that describe the
failure, including the time of failure, the surface that failed, the magnitude of failure and the
effectiveness of the surface after failure. AVDS receives all this information through its client
side socket and then starts the simulation.
The simulation within AVDS is setup so that it allows the “pilot” to “fly” the aircraft to
an altitude of 3000 ft, before data transfer takes place. From the time instant tha the aircraft takes
off till it reaches 3000 ft, there is no transfer of data from AVDS to the main and compute nodes
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on the cluster. As a consequence, no NN training takes place. Once the aircraft reaches 3000 ft,
AVDS sends out data frames at a rate of 30Hz across the socket to the master node. The master
node collects the data from AVDS and distributes it to all the compute nodes in the cluster. Once
all the data is distributed to the compute nodes, the master node then proceeds to execute the
code for the MNN while the other compute nodes execute the codes for the DNNs, based on their
individual ranks. For example, in the case of the SFDIA procedure, the node with rank 1 would
execute the code for the P-DNN, the node with rank 2 would execute the code for Q-DNN and
the node with rank 3 would execute the code for R-DNN. Once the forward and backward pass
of each DNN is complete, they send their respective outputs to the MNN. Within the MNN on
the master node, once all the estimates of the rate are received from the DNNs, the MNN
proceeds to compute the error metrics and perform the procedure for failure detection and
identification. Upon failure detection and/or identification, the MNN then proceeds to set
appropriate flags. These flags are then sent across to the DNNs during the next cycle of data
transfer.
In the case of AFDIA, the process is similar to that of the SFDIA, except that once the
error metrics are computed within the MNN and error flags are set or not set, this data is sent
back to the AVDS environment. During the next cycle, AVDS checks the flags to determine if a
failure has been declared and takes appropriate actions, based on the status of the flags.
Figure 5-9 shows the detailed working of the communication scheme between the Matlab
GUI, the Master node on the cluster and the AVDS environments for the parallel implementation
of the SFDIA and AFDIA schemes. Figure 5-10 shows the communication scheme between the
Matlab GUI, the Master node on the cluster and the AVDS environments for the sequential
training implementation of the NNs for SFDIA purposes.
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Figure 5-9 : Details of Matlab-Master Node-AVDS communication scheme
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Figure 5-10 : Sequential Implementation of Adaptive Flight Control System Schemes
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5.4

Modeling of Parallelization
Parallelization of a sequential algorithm conveys different meanings under different

contexts and cannot be generalized to apply for all contexts. The goals of parallelization differ
from each application and so, different criteria should be used as yardsticks for interpreting the
results of parallelization.
Within this research effort, the goal is to provide a proof of concept implementation of a
parallel distributed computation and control environment for the purpose of realizing a fault
tolerant flight control system. This fault tolerance is geared towards detecting, identifying and
accommodating for failures on systems of sensors without physical redundancy and failures on
the control surfaces of an aircraft. Towards this goal, a Beowulf cluster based parallel computing
environment was built from COTS components. Figure 5-10 gives the logical execution order of
a sequential implementation of the fault tolerant flight control scheme on a single node.
The first stage within this sequential implementation is the initialization of the NN
structures with the data from the Matlab GUI. Once the initialization parameters are received
from the Matlab environment, and the NNs initialized, the node then waits for the AVDS
simulation environment to start and initialize its client side sockets. The AVDS environment is
setup in such a way that it does not transmit data back to the master node until the aircraft is
above an altitude of 3000 feet. Once the aircraft breaches the 3000 ft barrier, it starts to send
frames of data back to the master node.
If TMNN, TPDNN, TQDNN and TRDNN are the times of execution of the MNN, PDNN, QDNN
and the RDNN respectively, then the total time that it takes to go through one cycle of execution
of the forward and backward paths of the NNs is the sum of all the individual execution times. If
t x is a time measure of uncertainties and jitter involved in the transfer of data to and from main
memory, the time taken for startup and other operations, and t1 is the time taken for the socket
communication between AVDS and the master node, then the total time taken for one cycle of
the sequential implementation can be given by
Ts = t1 + TMNN + TPDNN + T QDNN + TRDNN + TERR + t x
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Eq. 5.1
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Figure 5-11 : Sequential Algorithm
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Consider the parallel implementation of the SFDIA algorithm. The communication
sequence and the order of execution of the NN structures MNN, PDNN, QDNN and the RDNN
is shown in Figure 5-11.
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Figure 5-12 : Parallel Implementation Timing Chart
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In the following analysis, designating t1 to be the time taken for socket communication
between the AVDS environment and the main node on the Beowulf cluster, t M , t P , tQ , t R to be
the time taken by the MNN, PDNN QDNN and the RDNN to complete one cycle of learning and
trp , trq , trr the time taken for the MPI based communication between the master node and the
slave nodes on the cluster, we can derive an expression for the maximum time that it would take
to complete one cycle of training for all the networks in the cluster. To begin the analysis,
consider communication between the MNN and the PDNN only, the MNN will have the roll rate
estimate data from PDNN after either tM + trp or t P + trp . Depending on whether the MNN
finished computation earlier than the PDNN or PDNN finishes its computation earlier, the latest
time at which MNN will have the data from PDNN can be given as
max(t M +trp ,t P +trp )

Eq. 5.2

Now considering three networks, MNN, PDNN and the QDNN, the MNN will have the
roll rate estimate data from PDNN and pitch rate estimate data from the QDNN after either
tM + trp + trq or t P + trp + trq or tQ + trq , depending on which of the three processes finish their
computation earliest. Thus the latest time that the MNN will have the data from all the PDNN
and the QDNN can be given as
max(t M + trp + trq , t P + trp + trq , tQ + trq )

Eq. 5.3

Similarly, considering all the four networks MNN, PDNN< QDNN and the RDNN, the
MNN will have the roll rate estimate data from PDNN, pitch rate estimate data from the QDNN
and the yaw rate estimate data from the RDNN after either tM + trp + trq + trr or t P + trp + trq + trr or
tQ + trq + trr or t R + trr . Thus the latest time that the MNN will have the data from all the three
DNNs can be given as
max(t M + trp + trq + trr , t P + trp + trq + trr , tQ + trq + trr , t R + trr )

Eq. 5.4

And the total time for the parallel implementation to complete one cycle of learning can
be given as
TP = t1 + max(t M + trp + trq + trr , t P + trp + trq + trr , tQ + trq + trr , t R + trr )
+ t xMNN + t xPDNN + t xQDNN + t xRDNN
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Eq. 5.5

Since both the sequential and parallel implementations of the algorithms wait for the data
to arrive from AVDS, we can safely remove that wait time from the total time taken by both
implementations.
Ts = TMNN + TPDNN + T QDNN + TRDNN + TERR + t x

TP = max(t M + trp + trq + trr , t P + trp + trq + trr , tQ + trq + trr , t R + trr )
+ t xMNN + t xPDNN + t xQDNN + t xRDNN

Eq. 5.6
Eq. 5.7

Thus, the speedup that can be achieved by the parallel implementation of the sequential
algorithm can be expressed as
S=

Ts
TP

Eq. 5.6

Since the parallel implementation of the fault tolerant flight control schemes for SFDIA
and AFDIA purposes are set to run a predefined frequency of 30 Hz and since data
synchronization is absolutely important, blocking calls for Send and Receive operations are used.
From experimental data, the average time taken for the completion of one cycle of
learning for the sequential implementation is 0.0258 s. the average time for the completion of
one cycle of learning for the parallel implementation is also 0.0258 s. Thus, the speedup is given
by S = 1. Figure 5-12 gives a comparison of the execution times for the sequential and parallel
implementations of the training cycle of four NNs, namely the MNN, PDNN, QDNN and the
RDNN. Within this research work, the timing directives used to measure the time taken to
comple one cycle of NN training for the sequential and parallel implementations included the
time that the MNN waits to receive the frame of data from AVDS. This influences the timing
profile of both the sequential and parallel implementations, leading to similar execution times for
the sequential and parallel implementations.
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Figure 5-13 : Execution times for Sequential and Parallel Implementations
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Chapter 6 - Sensor and Actuator Failure Detection Identification
and Accommodation
The main objectives of this research are the design and simulation of adaptive flight
control schemes for the purposes of Sensor Failure Detection Identification and Accommodation
(SFDIA) and Actuator Failure Detection Identification and Accommodation (AFDIA) on a
distributed computational architecture. As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, this research effort
is divided into different phases, with incremental goals in each phase, leading to the
implementations of the SFDIA and AFDIA schemes on the distributed computational platform.
This chapter discusses the structure of the SFDIA and AFDIA algorithms, their
implementations and the results from the on-line simulation tests.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the MLP neural network architecture is used along with the
EBPA as the training algorithm as the adaptive component of the fault tolerant flight control
scheme. The SFDIA scheme consists of four distinct neural networks, namely the Main Neural
Network (MNN), and three De-Centralized Neural Networks (DNNs) P-DNN, Q-DNN and RDNN, representing the roll, pitch and yaw gyros.
The functionalities of the networks are designed so that the Main Neural Network will
learn the time histories of pitch, roll and yaw sensors, based on sensor outputs from time instant
‘k-1’ till ‘k-l’, from sensor systems onboard the aircraft. The time interval l is the training
pattern time window and exerts a huge influence on the time needed for training the network.
The overall outputs of the network are the estimates of the roll, pitch and yaw gyros at current
time instant ‘k’. On the other hand, the De-Centralized Neural Networks would estimate the
outputs of their respective sensors at the current time instant ‘k’, based on inputs from other
sensors onboard the aircraft. The most important distinction between the MNN and the DNNs is
that the MNN uses the values of the roll, pitch and yaw gyros, albeit from previous time
instances, among others, to estimate the current values of the roll, pitch and yaw rates. The
DNNs on the other hand, DO NOT use values from the sensor they are representing, to estimate
the current outputs. For example, the Q-DNN can have any measurements from any sensor
onboard the aircraft, except the pitch rate gyro. Similarly for the roll and yaw gyros, the inputs to
the DNNs could be the measurements from any sensor onboard the aircraft, except the roll rate
and the yaw rate respectively. This ensures that spurious inputs from a failed sensor cannot pass
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into the network that is trying to estimate the nominal values of the corresponding sensor and
corrupt the training process, keeping it trustworthy. Failure detection and identification is
achieved by monitoring the errors in the estimates of the rate gyro outputs, generated by the
MNN and the DNNs.

6.1

Types of Sensor Failures
This scope of this research in terms of the sensors whose behavior is to be emulated by

the networks is limited to only the rate gyroscopes, namely the pitch, roll and yaw gyros that are
assumed to be without physical redundancy. The output from a typical rate gyro is given as
Rate = K g (Vr (t ) − K 0 )

where:
Rate = Angular Velocity (deg/ sec)
K g is the rate gyro gain ((deg/ sec) / volt )

K 0 is the rate gyro offset (volt )
V is the voltage offset from rate gyro (Volt )

The accuracy of rate gyroscopes is characterized by two parameters, namely the drift and
the scale factor. Gyroscope drift is the ability of the gyro to reference all rate measurements to
the nominal zero rate measurement [48] and appears as an additive term in the gyro output. As a
consequence, any drift from the actual value would cause the angular error to accumulate,
resulting in faulty output from the gyroscope. The scale factor describes the ability of the gyro to
accurately sense the angular velocity at different angular rates and describes the sensitivity of the
sensor in deg/sec/volts. The accuracy of this parameter directly translates into the accuracy of the
output as it is used to convert the voltage output from the gyro into angular rate. If system
imperfections are present, it can result in variations of the scale factor and these variations would
appear as errors in the calibration of the output voltage versus the angular rate.
From the above descriptions, the generic sensor failures can be modeled as
1. Additive sensor failure: In this type of failure, a constant value appears as a bias in
the nominal sensor output and case can be modeled as X failure , i = X nom , i + ρ ni ,
where, ni is the direction vector of the faulty sensor and ρ is the magnitude of
the failure, positive or negative.
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2. Multiplicative sensor failure: This failure can be modeled by multiplying the
sensor’s

nominal

value

by

a

constant

factor

and

is

given

as X failure , i = (1 + kni ) X nom , i , where k is the multiplying factor for the i − th sensor.
This multiplicative failure can be further divided into two, based on the direction
vector ni as
a. Step type sensor failure, where ni = 1
b. Ramp type failures, where
 t −tf1

ni =  t f 2 − t f 1
 1


tf1 ≤ t ≤ tf 2

Eq 6.1

t >= t f 2

and t f 1 , t f 2 are the initial and final time instants of ramp type failures.

6.2

Sensor Failure Detection Identification and Accommodation
The Sensor Failure Detection Identification and Accommodation process is described in

the following sections. During the training process, the networks produce outputs that estimate
the pitch, roll and yaw gyro measurements at the current time instant and the interconnection
weights and thresholds within the network are adjusted, as described in Chapter 4, in such a
manner as to reduce the estimation error. In the original failure detection scheme, a quadratic
parameter MQEE (k ) , the sum of the squares of the difference between the outputs from the
MNN and the corresponding sensor values, is used for sensor failure detection (SFD). The
MQEE (k ) is given as
MQEE (k ) =

1 # ofDNNs
(Yi (k ) − Oi , MNN (k )) 2
∑
2 i =1

Eq 6.2

∧
^
^
1
= [( p(k ) − p MNN (k )) 2 + (q (k ) − q MNN (k )) 2 + (r (k ) − r MNN (k )) 2 ]
2

Eq 6.3

Under nominal operating conditions, when there is no sensor failure and the networks are
trained well, MQEE, which is a function of time, is close to zero, but when a sensor failure
occurs, the outputs from the networks differs significantly from the sensor values, resulting in
values of MQEE is significantly different from zero. Also, under nominal conditions, the
learning process is active on all the networks, including the MNN and the three DNNs. However,
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when the MQEE value exceeds a certain pre-defined threshold, a failure is declared, the learning
processes on all the networks is halted and subsequently, the sensor values are replaced by the
outputs from the DNNs, wherever the sensor measurements are used. This would constitute the
failure detection phase of the adaptive flight control scheme, where the occurrence of a generic
sensor failure is detected, but the actual failed sensor is not identified. The next step is the
identification of the failed sensor and can be achieved by monitoring the absolute value of the
estimation error at each DNN. If this value, at any of the DNNs, exceeds a pre-defined threshold,
the sensor failure is then identified on the corresponding sensor. The estimation error of the
DNNs is given by the following expression
^
1
DQEEx (k ) = ( x(k ) − x(k )) 2
2

Eq 6.4

where x = p, q, r
Once a sensor failure is identified, the next step involves the accommodation process for
the failed sensor, where the output from the x-DNN is used to replace the measurement from the
faulty sensor. This output is also used as an input to the MNN and also to any other DNN using
the sensor measurement as an input. This approach of using error statistics of both the MNN and
the DNNs would reduce the rate of false alarms in the failure detection and identification process.
Along with the original scheme for fault detection, a modified scheme is proposed to
improve the detection capabilities of the system for soft failures [49]. In this modified scheme,
the quadratic estimation error MQEE used in the original scheme is replaced by a different
quadratic estimation error, given by
1 # ofDNNs
OQEE (k ) =
(Oi , MNN (k ) − Oi , DNN (k )) 2
∑
2 i =1

Eq 6.5

^
^
^
^
^
1 ^
= [( p MNN (k ) − p DNN (k )) 2 + (q MNN (k ) − q DNN (k )) 2 + (r MNN (k ) − r DNN (k )) 2 ]
2

Eq 6.6

The need for an error statistic different from the MQEE can be justified by an analysis of
^

a typical ramp type sensor failure, for example, when one of the gyros fail, the output x MNN
would tend to track the corrupted sensor value since the MNN has the outputs from the failed
sensor as one of its input. As a result, the parameter MQEE does not provide accurate failure
^

detection, as the difference between x(k ) and x MNN is not significant enough to exceed the pre-
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defined threshold. On the other hand, the output of the x-DNN would try to track the “nominal”
value of the x-gyro, as it does not receive any measurement from the faulty sensor as an input.
This difference between the outputs of the MNN and the x-DNN would cause the parameter
OQEE to spike at the instant of failure and so can be used to detect a failure more reliable than
when using the MQEE parameter. A block diagram of the scheme is shown in Figure 6-1.
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Monitor MQEE, OQEE and Decentralized QEE

x-gyro fail ?

DQEEx <Thresh#1
(number of times)

Yes

No
Sensor
Failure
Detection

No

MQEE >Thresh_M
or
OQEE >Thresh_O

Observation

Send x-gyro data to
flight computer

Send x-DNN
Yes estimate to flight
computer

No

Resume x-DNN Learning
send x-gyro data to flight computer
Yes

x-DNN stops learning
send x-DNN estimate instead of x-gyro to flight
computer

Negative
Sensor
Failure
Identification
DQEEx >Thresh #1
(numner of times)
or
DQEE x >Thresh #2

Sensor Failure
Accommodation

Yes

No

End of observation period
Resume x-DNN learning
Send x-gyro data to flight computer

End of observation period
x-gyro failed !
Send x-DNN estimate to flight computer

Figure 6-1 : Block Diagram of SFDIA Scheme
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6.3

Results of Offline Training for SFDIA purposes
The NNs MNN, P-DNN, Q-DNN and R-DNN were trained offline for 100 epochs, using

flight data with 5000 data points, generated at 30 Hz, from the AVDS environment. These
trained networks were then tested every 10 epochs, starting from the 50th epoch, with data that it
had not seen during its training cycle. During the training cycle, the weights and thresholds of the
networks were saved after every 10 epochs. These pre-trained network structures were then used
within the on-line Sensor Failure Detection, Identification and Accommodation scheme running
on the cluster. The following figures Figure 6-2 through Figure 6-19 are representative of the
training and testing results for the MNN. Once the training was completed, the last set of weights
and thresholds from each network was saved as the starting point for the on-line learning during
the SFDIA and AFDIA tasks.

Figure 6-2 : MNN Output, Cycle 0, Roll Rate

68

Figure 6-3 : MNN Output, Cycle 0, Pitch Rate

Figure 6-4 : MNN Output, Cycle 0, Yaw Rate
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Figure 6-5 : MNN Output, Cycle 10, Roll Rate

Figure 6-6 : MNN Output, Cycle 10, Pitch Rate
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Figure 6-7 : MNN Output, Cycle 10, Yaw Rate

Figure 6-8 : MNN Output, Cycle 5, Roll Rate (Testing)
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Figure 6-9 : MNN Output, Cycle 5, Pitch Rate (Testing)

Figure 6-10 : MNN Output, Cycle 5, Yaw Rate (Testing)
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Figure 6-11 : MNN Output, Cycle 10, Roll Rate (Testing)

Figure 6-12 : MNN Output, Cycle 10, Pitch Rate (Testing)
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Figure 6-13 : MNN Output, Cycle 10, Yaw Rate (Testing)

The Decentralized Neural networks are trained and tested in a similar fashion to that of
the MNN with the same set of training data and testing data. The following figures represent the
training and testing cycle of the P-DNN, Q-DNN and the R-DNNs.
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Figure 6-14 : P-DNN Output, Cycle 0

Figure 6-15 : P-DNN Output, Cycle 10
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Figure 6-16 : P-DNN Output, Cycle 5 (Testing)

Figure 6-17 : P-DNN Output, Cycle 10 (Testing)
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Figure 6-18 : Q-DNN Output, Cycle 0

Figure 6-19 : Q-DNN Output, Cycle 10
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Figure 6-20 : Q-DNN Output, Cycle 5 (Testing)

Figure 6-21 : Q-DNN Output, Cycle 10 (Testing)
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Figure 6-22 : R-DNN Output, Cycle 0

Figure 6-23 : R-DNN Output, Cycle 10
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Figure 6-24 : R-DNN Output, Cycle 5 (Testing)

Figure 6-25 : R-DNN Output, Cycle 10 (Testing)

80

The RMS value of the training error for the MNN outputs and the P, Q and R DNN
outputs are presented in the following tables.
Table 6-1 : Mean of Training and Testing Errors on MNN Outputs

Trial 001

Cycle 0
Training

MNN P Output (deg/s)

Cycle 5
Testing Training

Cycle 10
Testing

Training

Testing

0.081970 no data 0.004492 0.013770 0.003696 0.012894

MNN Q Output (deg/s) 0.053757 no data 0.004127 0.024169 0.003774 0.023323
MNN R Output (deg/s) 0.025208 no data 0.008697 0.009485 0.000000 0.008345

Table 6-2 : Mean of Training and Testing Errors on P-DNN Output

Trial 001

Cycle 0
Training

Cycle 5
Testing Training

Cycle 10
Testing

Training

Testing

P-DNN P Output (deg/s) 0.070769 no data 0.007452 0.032378 0.019894 0.031356

Table 6-3 : Mean of Training and Testing Errors on Q-DNN Output

Trial 001

Cycle 0

Cycle 5

Training

Testing Training Testing

Q-DNN Q Output (deg/s) 0.038386 no data 0.11570

Cycle 10
Training Testing

0.050728 0.11491

0.043032

Table 6-4 : Mean of Training and Testing Error on R-DNN Output

Trial 001

Cycle 0
Training

Cycle 5
Testing Training

Cycle 10
Testing

Training

Testing

R-DNN R Output (deg/s) 0.021021 no data 0.007625 0.010511 0.007132 0.010215

6.4

SFDIA On-line Simulation and Implementation Results
For the purpose of Sensor Failure Detection, Identification and Accommodation, the

MNN, P-DNN, Q-DNN and R-DNN were trained with offline data from the AVDS environment
followed by the on-line simulation. The structures of the NNs used in this task are listed in the
table. As described earlier, the initial settings for the neural network structures are derived from
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the offline training process. Using the Matlab GUI, parameters describing the failed gyro, the
time of failure and the type of failure were set. Within this study, the failures on the gyros were
restricted to step type failures of a small (4 deg/s) and large (8 deg/s) bias amplitude. The
following table gives a listing of the structure of the NNs used for this study.
Table 6-5 : Structures of NN for SFDIA

Network

No. of Inputs

TW

ILN

HLN

Outputs

LR

MR

MNN

8

5

40

25

3

0.05

0.00

P-DNN

6

3

18

18

1

0.05

0.005

Q-DNN

4

5

20

20

1

0.1

0.00

R-DNN

5

4

20

25

1

0.075

0.005

Once the parameters of the SFDIA procedure were set using the Matlab GUI, they were
sent across the socket communication channel to the main node on the Beowulf cluster. When
the main node receives the simulation parameters data, it distributes the same to all the compute
nodes on the cluster. As described in section 5.3, once this process is complete, the main node
waits for the initialization string from AVDS. Once initialization string from AVDS is received,
the main node sends the task identification number and the total time of simulation across to
AVDS and then waits for the “pilot” to fly the aircraft. Within AVDS, once the task
identification number and the total time of simulation are received, the “pilot” takes off and
climbs to an altitude over 3000 ft. once the aircraft breaches the 3000 ft barrier, AVDS starts its
one-way communication with the main node and sends sensor data at a rate of 30 Hz. Within the
main node, once the data is received from AVDS, it is distributed across the compute nodes to
generate the estimates of the roll, pitch and yaw rates. These estimates are then sent back to the
main node where the error metrics are computed and stored. Once the time of failure is reached,
these error metrics are then used to check for failures on roll rate gyro, pitch rate gyro and the
yaw rate gyros. If a failure is detected on any of the gyros, then a flag indicating such an event is
set and sent as a part of the data stream to the DNNs at the next time step, indicating that a
failure had occurred at the previous step. Within the DNNs, a code segment checks for the status
of these specific flags to determine if the MNN had declared a failure on their respective gyro, at
the previous time step. If the flag is set to indicate a failure, then the DNN suspends it learning
process and begins the recall process. Thus from this time forward, the output from the DNN
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representing the failed gyro is used as an estimate of the actual sensor measurement. This trend
can be clearly seen in the plots of the MNN output for the channel representing the failed gyro.
Figures 6-26 to 6-31 show the results from the SFDIA procedure, with a step failure of 8
deg/sec bias occurring on the Q-gyro occurring at 50 sec into the flight. The error threshold on
the MNN is exceeded at 50.066s, indicating a failure on the sensor subsystems. Subsequently,
the error on the Q-DNN exceeds its thresholds at 50.066s, identifying the failure.

Figure 6-26 : Error Thresholds for Failure on Q (8 deg/s Bias)
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Figure 6-27 : MNN Outputs for Failure on Q (8 deg/s Bias)

Figure 6-28 : DNN Outputs for Failure on Q (8 deg/s Bias)
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Figure 6-29 : Velocity, Alpha, and Beta

Figure 6-30 : Euler Angles
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Figure 6-31 : Control Surface Deflections

Figures 6-32 to 6-37 show the results from the SFDIA procedure, with a step failure of 8
deg/sec bias occurring on the R-gyro occurring at 50 sec into the flight. The error threshold on
the MNN is exceeded at 50.066s, indicating a failure on the sensor subsystems. Subsequently,
the error on the R-DNN exceeds its thresholds at 50.066s, identifying the failure.
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Figure 6-32 : Error Thresholds for Failure on R (8 deg/s Bias)

Figure 6-33 : MNN Outputs for Failure on R (8 deg/s Bias)
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Figure 6-34 : DNN Outputs for Failure on R (8 deg/s Bias)

Figure 6-35 : Velocity, Alpha and Beta
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Figure 6-36 : Euler Angles

Figure 6-37 : Control Surface Deflections
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Figures 6-38 to 6-43 show the results from the SFDIA procedure, with a step failure of 8
deg/sec bias occurring on the P-gyro occurring at 50 sec into the flight. The error threshold on
the MNN is exceeded at 50.066s, indicating a failure on the sensor subsystems. Subsequently,
the error on the P-DNN exceeds its thresholds at 50.066s, identifying the failure.

Figure 6-38 : Error Thresholds for Failure on P (8 deg/s Bias)
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Figure 6-39 : MNN Outputs for Failure on P (8 deg/s Bias)

Figure 6-40 : DNN Outputs for Failure on P (8 deg/s Bias)
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Figure 6-41 : Velocity, Alpha and Beta

Figure 6-42 : Euler Angles
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Figure 6-43 : Control Surface Deflections
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The following table presents the results of post failure analysis of the estimation errors of
the MNN as well as the DNNs for small and large failures on the three gyros. The results are
tabulated from three runs of the failure scenarios.
Table 6-6 : Post Failure Estimation Error Analysis for MNN and DNNs
Failed

Magnitude

Gyro
MNN (P)

Small
P
Large

Q
Large

Small
R
Large

MNN (R)

P -DNN

Q - DNN

R – DNN

Mean

Std

Mean

Std

Mean

Std

Mean

Std

Mean

Std

Mean

Std

(deg/s)

(deg/s)

(deg/s)

(deg/s)

(deg/s)

(deg/s)

(deg/s)

(deg/s)

(deg/s)

(deg/s)

(deg/s)

(deg/s)

1

0.0025

0.1485

-0.2996

2.4389

2

0.0031

0.2408

-0.3938

3.9541

3

0.0030

0.2710

-0.0820

3.0787

1

0.005

0.2851

-0.2491

2.5425

2

0.0052

0.3011

0.4324

5.3915

3

0.0054

0.1741

-0.5300

2.8449

1
Small

MNN (Q)

0

0.4840

-1.0572

1.9829

2

0

0.6407

-1.3475

1.1470

3

-0.0020

0.4670

-1.4440

0.8234

1

0.0058

0.6535

-1.8091

1.5893

2

-0.0011

0.4177

-2.8651

1.5451

3

-0.0027

0.3587

-3.6574

1.8354

1

-0.0021

0.2452

-0.4275

0.3643

2

0

0.2476

-0.5766

0.4842

3

-0.0011

0.1565

-0.2128

0.2905

1

-0.0037

0.2911

-0.6409

0.5094

2

-0.0019

0.1124

-0.5555

0.1796

3

-0.0028

0.1621

-0.7719

0.3424

The following section describes the AFDIA procedures, the setup of the simulation runs
and results from the parallel implementation of the scheme on the Beowulf cluster.

6.5

Actuator Failure Detection Identification and Accommodation
The need for an adaptive flight control scheme is perhaps more acute in the case of

actuator failure as compared to sensor failure, as it is possible to have physical redundancy for
sensors onboard the aircraft, it is not possible to have physical redundancy for the control
surfaces and the lift generating sections of an airplane. The use of neural networks for state
estimation provides an attractive option to develop an analytical control scheme that would
reconfigure the control structure of the aircraft, in the event of an actuator failure. The goals of
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this section of the research effort is the detection, identification and accommodation of failures
on the control surfaces of an aircraft, using NN based controllers to drive the remaining
“healthy” control surfaces. Multiple failures on control surfaces, catastrophic failures such the
loss of an entire wing or a portion of the aircraft fuselage on the aircraft structures, and failures
on the propulsion systems onboard an aircraft are not considered within this research effort.
Within the scope of this research effort, actuator failures are defined and simulated as a
drop in surface efficiency, resulting from partial loss of surface, such as a missing part of a
control surface or stuck control surfaces, or a combination of the two and are divided into four
basic configurations as:
1. Stuck Left Elevator at trim/non-trim deflection, without missing surface;
2. Stuck Left Elevator at trim/non-trim deflection, with missing surface;
3. Stuck Left Aileron at trim/non-trim deflection, without missing surface;
4. Stuck Left Aileron at trim/non-trim deflection, with missing surface.
The mathematical modeling of actuator failures in the presence of control surface loss is
derived through a set of closed form expressions for the non-dimensional stability and control
derivatives and is a function of the normal force coefficients of the control surface with the failed
actuator. These equations for longitudinal stability derivatives given below:
cLα = K1,1 + K1,2 cLδ SR + K1,3cLδ SL

Eq 6.7

cmα = K 2,1 + K 2,2 cLδ SR + K 2,3cLδ SL

Eq 6.8

cL . = K 3,1 + K 3,2 cLδ SR + K 3,3cLδ SL

Eq 6.9

cm . = K 4,1 + K 4,2 cLδ SR + K 4,3cLδ S L

Eq 6.10

cLq = K 5,1 + K 5,2 cLδ SR + K 5,3cLδ SL

Eq 6.11

cmq = K 6,1 + K 6,2 cLδ SR + K 6,3cLδ SL

Eq 6.12

α

α

The implementation of the AFDIA scheme is similar to the SFDIA scheme and has four
distinct neural networks, namely the Main Neural Network (MNN), the pitch, roll and yaw
Neural Network Controllers (NNCs). The outputs of the MNN are the same as they are for the
SFDIA scheme and are the estimates of the outputs of the pitch, roll and yaw gyros, at a time
instant k. The outputs of the NNCs are the estimates of the control surface deflections at a time
instant k, computed from the time histories of measurements from the onboard sensors. Under

95

nominal conditions, the controller emulates the nominal deflections of the control surfaces and
does not assume any physical meaning. However, training under nominal conditions would help
improve the transient response of the network, following an actuator failure and the subsequent
actuator failure accommodation process. The error cost function that is minimized during the
training process is given as
^

J xnom = (δ yL ,R − δ yL ,R ) , where x = { pitch, roll , yaw} , y = {Elev, Ail , Rud } Eq 6.13
When an actuator failure occurs, it results in a change in the aircraft trim conditions due
to changes in the aerodynamic forces and moments. Failures on the control surfaces could also
lead to a reduction in their effectiveness, especially in cases where there is a loss of surface. With
the occurrence of such failures on the aircraft control surfaces, there results a change in the
angular velocities of the aircraft, consequently inducing a noticeable change in the value of the
quadratic error parameter MQEE in the MNN. If this value exceeds a certain predefined
threshold, a failure is implied. This part constitutes the Actuator Failure Detection (AFD)
component of the fault tolerant flight control scheme. Following AFD, actuator failure
identification is achieved by observing the auto and cross correlation coefficients between the
angular rates p, q and r. In general, for two random processes, the cross correlation coefficient is
defined by
RYX ( n) = E[Y (k ) X (k + n )]

Eq 6.14

The MNN monitors the error between the estimates of the roll, pitch and yaw rate gyros
and the actual measurements from the sensors themselves. If this error metric exceeds a
predefined threshold, then a flag is raised, indicating the occurrence of a possible failure. Then
MNN then examines the auto and cross correlation coefficients R pq , Rqr , R pr , Rtt , R ff .
The most significant effect of an actuator failure is the loss of symmetry on the aircraft,
which in turn would introduce a dynamic coupling between the longitudinal and lateral
directional aircraft dynamics. This dynamic coupling would result in significant changes in the
cross-correlation functions R pq , R pr , Rqr and the auto correlation coefficients Rtt , R ff , which can
be then used to identify the failed actuator. Once AFI is successfully determined, failure
accommodation is achieved by generating compensating control surface deflections as generated
by the individual NNCs.
In the case of the pitch NNC, an error cost function defined as:
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.

.

J PitchAFA = k1 ( q − qref ) + k2 (θ − θ ref ) + k3 ( q − qref )

Eq 6.15

.

where, qref = 0;θ ref = θ trim ; q ref = 0
is minimized in the longitudinal direction to generate the compensating Elevator deflections for
Actuator Failure Accommodation (AFA) in the longitudinal direction. At the same time,
compensating control surface deflections are generated from the roll and yaw NNC so that the
following cost functions are minimized in the lateral direction. These cost functions are defined
as:
J Roll AFA = k4 ( p − pref ) + k5 (φ − φref )

Eq 6.16

J YawAFA = k6 (r − rref )

Eq 6.17

In this research effort, the NNCs are executed in parallel on individual compute nodes on
the cluster and the compensating control surface deflections that are generated by the controllers
are sent to the MNN using the MPI directive MPI_Send. Once all the control surface deflections
are received within the MNN, it sends the same across the other socket interface to the AVDS
environment. The MNN also sends a flag indicating the detection and identification of actuator
failure along with the compensating control surface deflections. Code segments within the
AVDS environment read the status of these flags to determine if the control surface deflections
that are used in the dynamic simulation are to be from the pilot stick inputs or from the
controllers.
Within this research effort, the structure of the AFDIA scheme is built in such a way that
once actuator failures are detected and identified, the outputs from the controller takes over the
control of the aircraft and the pilot input is completely cut off. Improvements to this setup could
be to make use of a combination of the surface deflection commands from the pilot as well as the
commands from controller outputs.
The block diagram of the AFDIA scheme is shown in Figure 5.2
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Figure 6-44 : Block Diagram of the AFDIA Scheme

6.6

AFDIA On-line Simulation and Implementation Results
Similar to the procedure followed for the SFDIA purposes, the networks representing the

controllers were trained offline. The NNs ROLL-NNC, PITCH-NNC and YAW-NNC were
trained offline for 100 epochs, using flight data with 5000 data points, generated at 30 Hz, from
the AVDS environment. These trained networks were then tested every 10 epochs, starting from
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the 50th epoch, with data that it had not seen during its training cycle. During the training cycle,
the weights and thresholds of the networks were saved after every 10 epochs. The offline training
for the neural network controllers was primarily used to narrow down the structure of the
networks, particularly with regard to the inputs, the history time window, the number of hidden
layer neurons, and the learning and momentum rates. Unlike the SFDIA procedure, these pretrained networks were not used within the AFDIA scheme. With respect to the MNN, the
previously trained network structure for the SFDIA procedure was used as the baseline network
architecture for the on-line implementation of the AFDIA process. The following table gives a
listing of the structure of the NNs used for the purpose of actuator failure detection,
identification, and accommodation.
Table 6-7 : Structures of NN for AFDIA

Network

No. of

TW

Inputs

ILN

HLN

Outputs

LR

MR

MNN

8

5

40

25

3

0.05

0.005

Roll NNC

5

3

15

12

1

0.1

0.005

Pitch-NNC

3

2

6

20

1

0.1

0.005

Yaw-NNC

5

3

15

20

1

0.1

0.005

Similar to the setup procedure for SFDIA, once the parameters of the AFDIA procedure
were set using the Matlab GUI, they were sent across the socket communication channel to the
main node on the Beowulf cluster. The parameters include the surface that is scheduled to fail,
the time at which the failure is supposed to occur, the magnitude of failure and the resulting
effectiveness of the surface that failed. When the main node receives the simulation parameters
data, it distributes the same to all the compute nodes on the cluster. As described in section 5.3,
once this process is complete, the main node waits for the initialization string from AVDS. Once
initialization string from AVDS is received, the main node sends the task identification number,
the total time of simulation, and the failure specifications across to AVDS and then waits for the
“pilot” to start flying the aircraft. Within AVDS, once the task identification number and the
total time of simulation are received, the “pilot” takes off and climbs to an altitude over 3000 ft.
once the aircraft breaches the 3000 ft barrier, AVDS starts its two-way communication with the
main node and sends sensor data at a rate of 30 Hz. Within the main node, once the data is
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received from AVDS, it is distributed across the compute nodes to generate the estimates of the
roll, pitch and yaw rates. These estimates are then sent back to the main node where the error
metrics are computed and stored. Once the time of failure is reached, within the AVDS
environment, failure is injected on the selected surface. After this instant, the failed stops
receiving its input from the pilot stick, and stays fixed at the set position. On the other hand, all
the other surfaces continue to receive their inputs form the pilot stick. The aircraft dynamics are
simulated under this configuration until a failure is declared by the MNN, on the main node. On
the main node, once the failure time is reached, the MNN begins checking these error metrics for
failures.
When an actuator failure occurs, it generates noticeable changes in the aircraft trim
conditions a well as the aerodynamic forces and moments acting on the aircraft. This typically
leads to coupling between the lateral directional dynamics and the longitudinal directional
dynamics. This coupling can be seen in the output generated by the MNN. After the time of
failure is reached, the MNN begins checking the error metrics. When a predefined threshold on
the MNN error metrics exceeds a certain value, a failure condition is declared. Once a failure
condition is declared, the next step is the identification, which is done by monitoring the auto
correlation coefficients Rtt and Rff. if the thresholds on these coefficients are exceeded, and then
the appropriate failure is identified as either failure on the Elevators or Failures on the Ailerons.
Following failure detection and identification, a flag indicating such an event is set and sent as a
part of the data stream to the NNCs at the next time step, indicating that a failure had occurred at
the previous step. Once the MNN completes this section of its task, it sends a vector of 6
elements, ordered as the Pitch-NNC outputs for the elevator deflection in the first two elements,
the Roll-NNC outputs for the aileron deflection in the next two elements, the Yaw-NNC output
for the rudder deflection as the fifth element and a flag indicating the detection and identification
of an actuator failure as the sixth element across the socket to the AVDS environment. At each
time step, within the NNCs, a code segment checks for the status of the failure flag to determine
if the MNN had declared a failure on any control surface, at the previous time step. If the flag is
set to indicate a failure, then the NNCs switch their failure mode error generation configuration.
Unlike the case of SFDIA, the learning of the NNCs is not suspended and continues to generate
the compensating control surface deflections according to the error formulation. Now, within the
AVDS environment, another segment of code checks the vector of data that it received from the
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MNN at the previous time step to see if the MNN declared a failure. If the MNN had declared a
failure, then the code segment accordingly switches to the outputs of the controller as the control
surface deflection inputs to the aircraft dynamics.
Once the failure on the control surface is declared and identified, controller takes total
authority of the aircraft and attempts to stabilize the aircraft with the help of the remainder of the
healthy control surfaces. In this setup for this research study, the pilot is totally removed from the
loop.
Within this research effort, as mentioned earlier, failures on only the Elevators and the
Ailerons were considered. Simulations were run on the cluster and the results from the
simulations are tabulated below. The following failure scenarios on the left elevator scenarios
were considered.
•

5 deg failure on Left Elevator, with 50% reduction in efficiency, at 50 sec.

•

5 deg failure on Left Elevator, with 100% reduction in efficiency, at 50 sec.

•

15 deg failure on Left Elevator, with 50% reduction in efficiency, at 50 sec.

•

15 deg failure on Left Elevator, with 100% reduction in efficiency, at 50 sec.

•

0 deg failure on Left Elevator, with 50% reduction in efficiency, at 50 sec.

•

0 deg failure on Left Elevator, with 100% reduction in efficiency, at 50 sec.

On the Left Aileron, the following failures were considered
•

5 deg failure on Left Aileron, with 50% reduction in efficiency, at 50 sec.

•

5 deg failure on Left Aileron, with 0% reduction in efficiency, at 50 sec.

•

15 deg failure on Left Aileron, with 50% reduction in efficiency, at 50 sec.

•

15 deg failure on Left Aileron, with 0% reduction in efficiency, at 50 sec.

•

0 deg failure on Left Aileron, with 50% reduction in efficiency, at 50 sec.

•

0 deg failure on Left Aileron, with 0% reduction in efficiency, at 50 sec.

The results of parallel AFDIA implementation on the cluster can be tabulated as follows.
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Table 6-8 : Results of Failure Detection and Identification on Left Elevator and Aileron
Scenario

Main error threshold

Autocorrelation

exceeded at

threshold exceeded at

5 deg, 50%

50.133 s

51.866 s

Yes

5 deg, 100%

50.125 s

50.00 s

-

15 deg, 50%

50.172 s

54.910 s

Yes

15 deg, 100%

50.1 s

51.3

Yes

0 deg, 50%

50.133 s

59.133 s

Yes

5 deg, 50%

50.066 s

53.7 s

Yes

5 deg, 0%

50.066 s

51.5 s

Yes

10 deg, 50%

50.066 s

51.766 s

Yes

10 deg, 0%

No data

No data

No data

0 deg, 50%

50.078 s

-

No

0 deg, 0%

50.133 s

-

No

Elev (L)

Ail (L)

Failure Identification

0 deg, 100%

Statistical analysis was performed on the flight data sets from the simulation environment
to determine the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, to achieve a good trade off
between true positive rates and false positive rates while detecting the presence of actuator
failures. A 2x2 table representing the true and false positives and negatives, used to determine
the ROC curves is shown below in Table 6-9.
Table 6-9 : 2 by 2 Table for Determining Failure Detection Rates

Failure Present

Failure Absent

Failure Detected

True Positive

False Positive

Failure Not Detected

False Negative

True Negative

The corresponding ROC curves for failure detection on the Left Aileron and the Left
Elevator are shown in the following figures.
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Figure 6-45 : ROC Curve for Aileron Failure

Figure 6-46 : ROC Curve for Elevator Failure

The following table presents the results of post failure analysis of the tracking errors of
the controller for failures on the Ailerons and Elevator. The results are tabulated from three runs
of the failure scenarios.
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Table 6-10 : Post Failure Tracking Error Analysis for Failures on Left Elevator and Aileron
Failed Surface

Failure Magnitude
(deg)
P (deg/s)
Eff.
0

Left Elevator

5

15

0

Left Aileron

5

10

Q (deg/s)

R (deg/s)

Mean

Std

Mean

Std

Mean

Std

50%

-0.0425

0.2623

0.0359

0.4536

-0.0621

0.1295

100%

0.0068

0.2683

0.0208

0.9440

-0.0416

0.1215

50%

-0.0071

0.2053

-0.0173

0.4133

0.0303

0.1328

100%

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

50%

-0.0035

0.1763

0.0161

0.3372

-0.0882

0.0925

100%

0.0039

0.2735

0.0382

0.6991

-0.0393

0.1176

50%

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

0%

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

50%

-0.0336

2.6439

0.3099

0.6814

0.3204

0.6442

0%

5.1164

10.2927

0.7769

2.0945

0.1052

0.7835

50%

4.9556

10.0559

1.1856

3.4311

0.5455

0.7988

0%

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data

No data
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The following figures 6-45 to 6-50 represent the results of Actuator Failure detection,
Identification and Accommodation on the Left Elevator for a 5 deg failure with 50% reduction in
the efficiency of the failed surface. The error threshold on the MNN is exceeded at 50.133s,
indicating a failure on the sensor subsystems. Subsequently, the error on the Rtt exceeds its
thresholds at 51.866s, identifying the failure.

Figure 6-47 : Error Thresholds for Failure on Left Elevator (5 deg, 50% eff.)

105

Figure 6-48 : Control Surface Deflections, Failure on Left Elevator (5 deg, 50% eff.)

Figure 6-49 : Angular Rates of the Aircraft, for Failure on Left Elevator (5 deg, 50% eff.)

106

Figure 6-50 : Euler Angles, for Failure on Left Elevator (5 deg, 50% eff.)

Figure 6-51 : Euler Angles, for Failure on Left Elevator (5 deg, 50% eff.)
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Figure 6-52 : MNN Outputs, for Failure on Left Elevator (5 deg, 50% eff.)

The following figures 6-51 to 6-56 represent the results of Actuator Failure detection,
Identification and Accommodation on the Left Elevator for a 0 deg failure with 50% reduction in
the efficiency of the failed surface. The error threshold on the MNN is exceeded at 50.133s,
indicating a failure on the actuators. Subsequently, the error on the Rtt exceeds its thresholds at
59.133s, identifying the nature of the failure in terms of the failed surface.
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Figure 6-53 : Error Thresholds for Failure on Left Elevator (0 deg, 50 % eff.)

Figure 6-54 : Control Surface Deflections, for Failure on Left Elevator (0 deg, 50 % eff.)
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Figure 6-55 : Aircraft Angular rates, for Failure on Left Elevator (0 deg, 50 % eff.)

Figure 6-56 : Euler Angles, for Failure on Left Elevator (0 deg, 50 % eff.)
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Figure 6-57 : Velocity, Alpha and Beta, for Failure on Left Elevator (0 deg, 50 % eff.)

Figure 6-58 : MNN Outputs, for Failure on Left Elevator (0 deg, 50 % eff.)
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The following figures 6-57 to 6-62 represent the results of Actuator Failure Detection,
Identification and Accommodation on the Left Aileron for a 5 deg failure with 50% reduction in
the efficiency of the failed surface. The error threshold on the MNN is exceeded at 50.066s,
indicating a failure on the actuators. Subsequently, the error on the Rff exceeds its thresholds at
53.7s, identifying the failure.

Figure 6-59 : Error Thresholds for Failure on Left Aileron (5 deg, 50% eff.)
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Figure 6-60 : Control Surface Deflection, for Failure on Left Aileron (5 deg, 50% eff.)

Figure 6-61 : Aircraft Angular Rates, for Failure on Left Aileron (5 deg, 50% eff. )
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Figure 6-62 : Euler Angles, for Failure on Left Aileron (5 deg, 50% eff. )

Figure 6-63 : Velocity, Alpha and Beta, for Failure on Left Aileron (5 deg, 50% eff. )
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Figure 6-64 : MNN Outputs, for Failure on Left Aileron (5 deg, 50% eff. )

The following figures 6-63 to 6-68 represent the results of Actuator Failure detection,
Identification and Accommodation on the Left Aileron for a 0 deg failure with 50% reduction in
the efficiency of the failed surface. The error threshold on the MNN is exceeded at 50.078s,
indicating a failure on the sensor subsystems. Although the error threshold on the MNN exceeds
its threshold, the failure is not identified in this case as the auto correlation coefficient Rff stays
within its threshold. This could be the result of the nature of the failure on the aileron, with the
aileron stuck at 0 degrees and with only a 50% loss in efficiency.
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Figure 6-65 : Error Thresholds, for Failure on Left Aileron (0 deg, 50 % eff.)

Figure 6-66 : Control Surface Deflection, for Failure on Left Aileron (0 deg, 50 % eff.)
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Figure 6-67 : Aircraft Angular rates, for Failure on Left Aileron (0 deg, 50 % eff.)

Figure 6-68 : Euler Angles, for Failure on Left Aileron (0 deg, 50 % eff.)
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Figure 6-69 : Velocity, Alpha and Beta, for Failure on Left Aileron (0 deg, 50 % eff.)

Figure 6-70 : MNN Outputs, for Failure on Left Aileron (0 deg, 50 % eff.)
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Chapter 7 - Conclusions and Recommendations
This research effort addresses the design and development of an adaptive flight control
scheme to recover an aircraft from failures to its sensor systems and perform the sensor failure
detection, identification and accommodation (SFDIA) and its actuators and perform the actuator
failure detection, identification and accommodation (AFDIA). The fault tolerant flight control
schemes are based on a set of neural network structures named as the Main Neural Network, and
Decentralized Neural Network and Neural Network Controller. For the purpose of SFDIA, a
combination of the MNN and three DNNs called the P-DNN, Q-DNN and the R-DNN are used.
The P, Q, and R DNNs are designed to estimate the outputs of the roll, pitch and yaw gyros at
time instant ‘k’, based on inputs from sensor systems onboard the aircraft from time instant ‘k-1’
till ‘k-l’. The restriction on the DNNs is that the P-DNN cannot have the roll rate as its input, the
Q-DNN cannot have the pitch rate as its input and the R-DNN cannot have the yaw rate as its
input. This is done primarily to ensure that the outputs from these networks are not tainted by
any failures on the rate gyros and thus can be relied upon to provide good estimates of the rates
in case of failures on the gyros. The MNN generates the estimates of the three gyros at time ‘k’
based on inputs from the sensor system from time ‘k-1’ to ‘k-l’. The MNN does not have any
restrictions on the use of the rate gyro measurements to estimate the current values. A quadratic
error parameter, MQEE which is the sum of the squares of the error in the rate estimates from the
MNN and the DNNs is used for the detection of failures on the gyros. Step type failures of two
different magnitudes were introduced on the rate gyros to evaluate the sensor failure detection,
identification and accommodation scheme. Upon the introduction of the failures on the sensor
outputs, the error metric MQEE showed a sudden spike indicating a failure on one of the sensor
systems, while the DQEE parameter, which is the square of the estimation error on each of the
individual DNNs provided the failure identification. Step type failures of 4 deg/s and 8 deg/s
were successfully injected on the sensors, and subsequently detected and identified successfully
on the distributed computational platform.
Although accommodating for sensor failures are important in flight control systems, it
takes a lower priority when compared to the accommodation for failures to the actuator systems
onboard the aircraft. On the other hand, if the outputs from the rate gyros without physical
redundancy are used in closed loop flight control laws, identifying and accommodating for
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failures on the gyros becomes as important as accommodating for on-board actuator failures.
Within the scope of this research study, actuator failures refer to failures to the control surfaces
on board the aircraft, especially the left elevator and the left aileron. Failures refer to the
situations in which these control surfaces are locked at a given position, with or without the
added effect of a loss of surface. Such failure conditions introduce a significant coupling of
lateral and longitudinal directional dynamics on the aircraft. The AFDIA scheme is designed
along the lines of the SFDIA scheme, with the MNN and three Neural Network Controllers,
namely the Roll-NNC, Pitch-NNC and the Yaw-NNC. As with the SFDIA scheme, the MNN is
designed to estimate the values of the pitch, roll and yaw rate gyros at time ‘k’, based on inputs
from time ‘k-1’ till ‘k-l’. the NNCs on the other hand provide the estimates of the control surface
deflections at time ‘k’, based on inputs from the sensor systems from time ‘k-1’ till ‘k-l’. Once
failure is detected and identified, the controller takes over the “flying” of the aircraft and restores
it to equilibrium conditions.
Within the goals of this research effort was the design of an interface between the neural
network based fault tolerant flight control schemes and a simulation/visualization environment.
AVDS was chosen as the simulation/visualization environment mainly due to previous
experience in using the commercially available software package among members of Dr.
Marcello Napolitano’s research group and the fact that AVDS allows the user to customize its
code to suit their needs. Towards achieving the goal of interfacing this environment with the
fault tolerant flight control schemes, a TCP/IP socket based communication and data transfer
scheme was designed and successfully implemented. The scheme is based on the client-server
model, with the AVDS environment acting as the client side socket.
Another important phase of this research effort was the successful design and
development of a Matlab based GUI tool that would enable the user to interactively set the
parameters to define the simulation tasks. This GUI tool provides the user with flexibility to
change the structure of the NNs that are used within the fault tolerant flight control schemes.
With the help of this tool, the user can change the inputs to the NN structure, the time history
window of the inputs, the number of hidden layer neurons, and the learning and momentum rates
for the interconnection weights between the nodes of the fully connected NN and the thresholds
at each node. This tool also deploys a client side TCP/IP socket that is later used to transfer the
simulation parameters to the master node on the cluster.
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The typical implementations of flight control schemes are on standalone computational
platforms. One of the goals of this research effort was the development of a distributed
computing platform that would enable the fault tolerant flight control schemes to be executed in
parallel. This goal was successfully realized and a Beowulf cluster was built with 7 compute
nodes, nodes1-7 from COTS components. All the compute nodes on the cluster were running the
Linux operating system, kernel version 2.4.20-8 and the cluster communication was based on the
Message Passing Interface. For all the tasks, source code was written in C and was structured in
such a way that different sections of the code were conditionally executed, based on the rank of
the process executing the code, loosely following a SIMD model. The node executing the code
for MNN is designated as the master node and is responsible for coordinating the data
communication between the AVDS environment and all the other compute nodes on the cluster.
The master node coordinates communication between the cluster and Matlab GUI on one
hand and cluster and AVDS on the other hand, using sockets. Once the tasks are initialized on
the cluster, a section of code within the master node creates a server side socket and waits for the
Matlab GUI to initialize itself and create a client side socket. There is exchange of initialization
flags between the master node and the Matlab GUI, followed by the transfer of all the simulation
parameters that were set using the GUI, to the master node. The master node now has all the
parameter that defines the four network structures MNN, PDNN, QDNN and RDNN and other
simulation and task related parameters, such as the time of simulation, and failure specifications.
This node then uses MPI directives to send these parameters to all the compute nodes on the
cluster, which then proceed to initialize their respective network structures. When AVDS is
initialized, it also receives simulation parameters and once the aircraft reaches 3000 ft in altitude,
it starts to send sensor data back to the master node using its client side sockets. The master node
then distributes this frame of data to all the compute nodes in the cluster. Once the learning cycle
is complete on all the compute nodes, the estimates are sent back to the master node wherein
error metrics are computed and failure checking is done. If a failure is detected, appropriate flags
are set and sent along with the frame of sensor data from AVDS, during the next time step, to all
the compute nodes, which tailor their execution responses based on the status of the failure flags.
The AFDIA scheme was successfully implemented on the distributed computation
environment for failures on the Left Elevator and the Left Aileron. The failures on the surfaces
included the surface being stuck at 0 deg deflection, 5 deg deflection and 15 degree deflection,
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with a loss of surface. The AFDIA scheme was able to detect the failures and able to
accommodate for them, except in the case of 0 deg failures on the aileron.

7.1

Recommendations for Future Work
This research effort provided a proof of concept implementation of a COTS cluster based

distributed computing environment for the purpose of implementation of a fault tolerant flight
control scheme. Under the current setup, the compute nodes are made up of desktop computers,
running a non real-time version of the Linux operating system. This entire setup can be shrunk
into a more compact physical size by migrating the cluster to PC104 based compute nodes.
Another suggestion would be to make use of real-time extensions to the Linux operating system,
making the entire operation run in real time. With increasing emphasis towards flight tests of
fault tolerant flight control schemes, the logical step forward from this research effort would be
the flight tests on UAV test platforms. Within the fault tolerant flight control scheme, future
work could include the integration of the SFDIA and the AFDIA tasks to detect, identify and
accommodate for failures on both the sensor systems as well as the actuators. Also, the
interactive GUI in Matlab could be expanded to allow the user to choose the learning algorithm
of the neural networks, and possibly even the NN architecture itself.
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Appendix A
A.1

Sample Three Dimensional Lookup Table
This section shows a sample of the three dimensional lookup tables for the F4 aircraft

dynamics.
#
#
#

Aero Coefficients for F4 aircraft dynamics

# Cdo : basic drag coefficient
#
:DB 5 0 0 Mach None None 1.0 0.0
0.0
0.206 0.900 1.800 9.00
0.0269 0.0269 0.0205 0.0439 0.0439
#
# Cdu : drag coefficient due to translational velocity
#
:Du 5 0 0 Mach None None 1.0 0.0
0.0
0.206 0.900 1.800 9.00
0.0
0.0
0.027 -0.054 -0.054

#
# Cda : drag coefficient due to angle of attack
#
:Da 5 0 0 Mach None None 1.0 0.0
0.0
0.206 0.900 1.800 9.00
0.555 0.555 0.300 0.400 0.400
#
# Cdf : drag coefficient due to flap deflection
#
:Df 5 0 0 Mach None None 1.0 0.0
0.0
0.206 0.900 1.800 9.00
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
#
# Cdg : drag coefficient due to gear deflection
#
:Dg 5 0 0 Mach None None 1.0 0.0
0.0
0.206 0.900 1.800 9.00
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
#
# Clo : basic lift coefficient
#
:LB 5 0 0 Mach None None 1.0 0.0
0.0
0.206 0.900 1.800 9.00
0.43
0.43
0.100 0.01
0.01
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#
# Cla : lift coefficient due to angle of attack
#
:La 5 0 0 Mach None None 1.0 0.0
0.0
0.206 0.900 1.800 9.00
2.80
2.80
3.75
2.80
2.80
#
# Clde : lift coefficient due to elevator deflection
#
:Le 5 0 0 Mach None None 1.0 0.0
0.0
0.206 0.900 1.800 9.00
0.24
0.24
0.40
0.25
0.25
#
# Cldf : lift coefficient due to flap deflection
#
:Lf 5 0 0 Mach None None 1.0 0.0
0.0
0.206 0.900 1.800 9.00
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
#
# Clq : lift coefficient with dimensionless pitch rate
#
:Lq 5 0 0 Mach None None 1.0 0.0
0.0
0.206 0.900 1.800 9.00
1.33
1.33
1.80
1.30
1.30

A.2
•

User Defined Simulation Code Block Header Information
Blockname

-

the

name

of

the

user

code

block.

This

is

entered

in

the

usr_cblock.c file to notify AVDS of this new code block.
•

Type - the value in this location is either USR_FCS or USR_AC. The type of the
block determines where it is displayed on the Aircraft Initialization page.

•

Description of code block - a textual description of the code block. This
description is displayed in the type menu for the aircraft of FCS on the
Aircraft Initialization.

•

in1 in2 in3 in4 in5 in6 ... - a list of the inputs to this block. These are
displayed under FCS In or AC In on the Aircraft Initialization page.

•

out1 out2 out3 ... - a list of the outputs from this block. These are displayed
under FCS Out or AC Out on the Aircraft Initialization page.

•

param1 param2 param3 param4 ... - a list of the parameters that will have
corresponding look-up tables.

•

r - the update rate in Hz is based on this integer number. The actual update
may vary depending on the computer and complexity of the simulation model.

•

Init_func - the name of a function that AVDS will call to initialize the code
block.

•

update_func - the name of the function that AVDS calls at the rate specified by
"r" to update the simulation.
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CBlock blockname = {
type,
/*
"description of code block" ,
/*
"in1 in2 in3 in4 in5 in6...",
/*
"out1 out2 out3...",
/*
"param1 param2 param3 param4...", /*
r,
/*
init_func
/*
update_func
/*
}
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Type */
Description */
Inputs */
Outputs */
Params*/
Update Rate (Hz) */
Init Function*/
Update Function */

Appendix B
B.1

Sample User Defined Simulation Code Block.

#include <usr_cblock.h>
int nBlocks = 1;
CBlock FBgainFCS;
Cblock *pCBlockx[] = {&FBgainFCS};
void fcs_init();
void fcs_update();
/* Add declaration of code blocks */
CBlock FBgainFCS = {
USR_FCS,
/* Type */
"Feedback Gains",
/* Description */
"Ps Rs Ys Ts P Q R",
/* Inputs */
"de da dr dt",
/* Outputs */
"k1 k2 k3 cmd1 cmd2 cmd3",
/* Parameters */
20,
/* Update Rate (Hz) */
fcs_init,
/* Init Function */
fcs_update
/* Update Function */
};
enum { STICK_P, STICK_R, STICK_Y, STICK_T, ROLL, PITCH, YAW }; /* Inputs */
enum { D_ELE, D_AIL, D_RUD, D_THR }; /* Outputs */
enum { GAIN_P, GAIN_R, GAIN_Y, GAIN_CP, GAIN_CR, GAIN_CY}; /* Parameters
*/
void
fcs_init( input, output, param )
double *input, *output, *param;
{
output[D_ELE] = input[STICK_P]*param[GAIN_CP]+input[PITCH]*param[GAIN_P];
output[D_AIL] = input[STICK_R]*param[GAIN_CR]+input[ROLL]*param[GAIN_R];
output[D_RUD] = input[STICK_Y]*param[GAIN_CY]+input[YAW]*param[GAIN_Y];
output[D_THR] = input[STICK_T];
}
void
fcs_update( input, output, param )
double *input, *output, *param;
{
output[D_ELE] = input[STICK_P]*param[GAIN_CP]+input[PITCH]*param[GAIN_P];
output[D_AIL] = input[STICK_R]*param[GAIN_CR]+input[ROLL]*param[GAIN_R];
output[D_RUD] = input[STICK_Y]*param[GAIN_CY]+input[YAW]*param[GAIN_Y];
output[D_THR] = input[STICK_T];
}
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